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Securitization of Dual Citizenship in Germany 
Eva Hörtner 
Abstract 
The securitization of migration has been well-researched. In stark contrast, a research gap 
exists concerning the securitization of (dual) citizenship across countries. This thesis 
addresses this gap by investigating two research questions. Firstly, it looks at discursive 
securitization by analyzing if and how the debate on dual citizenship is securitized, and 
whether or not representations of Turkish-Germans and Russian-Germans feed-into the 
securitization of dual citizenship within the German center-right discourse. Secondly, this 
study investigates how the management of unease, the securitization of routine, plays out 
in naturalization practices in Germany. The thesis focuses on the more concrete question 
of how the practice of awarding dual citizenship with naturalizations differs in Germany, 
with a focus on naturalized former Turkish and Russian citizens and naturalized Turkish-
German and Russian-German citizens. To achieve this goal a discourse analysis is 
conducted drawing on 30 articles, from the center-right newspaper Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). Furthermore, changes in naturalization practices are 
investigated and the practice of awarding dual citizenship with naturalization is analyzed 
drawing on the naturalization statistics of the German Federal Statistical Office. The 
analysis shows that the center-right discourse on (dual) citizenship has to be subdivided 
into two discourses, a liberal and a conservative discourse. The conservative discourse’s 
securitization move seeks to establish the German identity as being existentially 
threatened by linking the discourse to representations of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ as Other, 
presenting them as ‘inferior’ and as “undermining the standards of the [‘German’] self” 
(Diez 2005, 628). The discursive representation of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ as ‘inferior’ is 
reflected in an ‘unease’ towards naturalized former Turkish/Turkish-German citizens. 
The representation of the ‘Russian-Germans’ as ‘different’ is partially mirrored in a 
relative ‘ease’ towards naturalized former Russian/Russian-German citizens. However, 
this ‘ease’ is tightened over time at a federal level.  
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1. Introduction 
Headlines such as “Two passports – chance or threat?” (Monitor 2017), “terror with two 
passports,” (Müller 2014b) and the perception of politicians, especially members of the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), that “dual 
citizenship is harmful” (Reimann 2017) suggest that mechanisms of securitization are at 
play concerning (dual) citizenship in German discourse. In German discourse, dual 
nationality is often closely associated with conflicts of loyalties. Dual citizens are 
presented as subject to manipulation, as a fifth column and as a “submissive tool” 
(Monitor 2017) of the state of their second citizenship (ibid.).  
This thesis therefore aims to investigate if and how the center-right discourse1 on dual 
citizenship is securitized in Germany. Moreover, it aims to analyze how the discursive 
representations of Russian-German and Turkish-German dual citizens feed into (or do not 
feed into) the securitization of dual citizenship in the German center-right discourse. 
These groups are selected as they form the two largest groups of dual citizens holding 
both German and a non-EU citizenship2. This thesis analyzes how ‘Russian-Germans’ 
and ‘Turkish-Germans’3 are represented and incorporated into the logic of arguments in 
                                                          
1 The center-right refers to the positioning of the newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that mostly 
reflects the political center-right position, and on which the discourse analysis is conducted. 
2 In Germany, there are between 1.87 million (micro-census 2016) and 4.3 million (census 2011) German 
dual nationals. Out of this 4.3 million, 690,000 held Polish citizenship, 570,000 Russian citizenship and 
530,00 Turkish citizenship simultaneously. As per the micro-census conducted in 2016 the figures of 
German dual citizens are currently much smaller and amount to 252,000 individuals with German- Russian 
dual citizenship and 247,000 individuals with German-Turkish dual citizenship (Destatis 2017c). In 2017, 
19.3 million Germans had a migrant background; 2.8 million (14 percent) people with a Turkish migrant 
background, 2.1 million (11 percent) people with a Polish migrant background, 1.4 million (7 percent) with 
a Russian migrant background, 1.2 million (6 percent) with a Kazakh migrant background and 0.9 million 
(4 percent) with a Romanian migrant background. Since the year 2017, the micro census collects data on 
the languages spoken predominantly in households in Germany. In 2.5 million out of 24.0 million multi-
person households a foreign language was mainly spoken. Turkish prevailed in 17 percent, Russian in 15 
percent, Polish in 8 percent and Arabic in 7 percent of them (Destatis 2018b).  
3 This thesis uses the terms Turkish-Germans/Russian-Germans throughout the study except when talking 
about naturalizations in Germany (c.f. footnote 5) or when specifically referring to the group of (Spät)-
Aussiedler (c.f. footnote 14). Regarding the representation of Turkish-Germans/Russian-Germans, the 
terms are used in inverted commas to point out the constructed character of the representations. In chapter 
4, different terms are only used if explicitly wanting to point out a different naming strategy within German 
discourse.  
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the discourse on dual citizenship. These two groups of dual citizens are especially 
interesting for investigation as a rift in relations between Russia and Germany as well as 
Turkey and Germany have taken place since 2014 and concerns have been voiced that 
these groups could be influenced by the state of their second citizenship. Therefore, 
against the background of political tensions at the state-to-state level, it could be expected 
that the discourse on dual citizenship for both groups is severely politicized, perhaps to 
the degree that it drifts into the language of security, so that it becomes securitized. 
While the focus of this study is the discursive securitization of (dual) citizenship, it also 
looks at the practices of securitization. Scholars (Bourbeau 2014, 188; Léonard 2010, 
236) have suggested “that it is possible to combine insights from the two approaches […] 
to study both the discourses and practices of securitization. Such a strategy can reveal 
interesting differences between everyday practices […] and discourses” (Léonard 2010, 
236). The difference in discursive representation, and possible securitization of both 
‘Turkish-Germans’ and ‘Russian-Germans’ may also be visible in specific practices of 
naturalization. The logic of routine and the logic of exception alongside each other makes 
it possible to combine insights gained from the study of both the discourses and practices 
of securitization. Furthermore, comparing securitizing discourses and practices can 
provide an understanding of how everyday practices and discourses differ from one 
another or complement one another (Bourbeau 2014, 188; Léonard 2010, 236).  
For studying the securitization of everyday practices this thesis looks at naturalization 
practices in Germany. While Germany still upholds the principle of avoiding dual 
citizenship with naturalizations, statistics show that between 50.0 percent (2012, lowest 
number) to 61.4 percent4 (2017, highest number) of naturalization candidates from 2010 
to 2017 were allowed to retain their citizenship (c.f. figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67). Therefore, 
this study investigates how the management of unease, the securitization of routine, plays 
out in the naturalization practices of Germany. While this thesis does analyze general 
trends in the practice of awarding dual citizenship with naturalization, the focus is on the 
                                                          
4 This high percentage is partially caused by the fact that EU-citizens have the right to dual citizenship, 
however, naturalization rates for EU-citizens are relatively low on average (Thränhardt 2017). Therefore, 
it can only partially account for this phenomenon.  
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concrete question of how the practice of awarding dual citizenship with naturalizations 
differs in Germany, particularly looking at the cases of naturalized former Turkish and 
Russian citizens and naturalized Turkish-German and Russian-German citizens5, with. 
Finally, the findings of the analysis of the discursive securitization of dual citizenship and 
the securitization of everyday practices are compared to examine how discourses and 
everyday practices interrelate concerning dual citizenship in Germany. 
Literature on the topic of securitization and especially on the securitization of migration 
have gained in prominence (c.f. Bigo 2002; Bourbeau 2011; Doty 1998; Huysmans 2000; 
Huysmans 2006; Munster 2009; Watson 2009). The same holds true for scholarly 
literature on the politics of citizenship (c.f. Bauböck 2006; Howard 2009; Foroutan 2013; 
Joppke 2010; Kivisto and Faist 2010; Levy and Weiss 2002; Shachar et al. 2017) and dual 
citizenship (Faist 2007; Faist and Kivisto 2007). However, while the securitization theory 
has addressed the issue of migration in-depth, little has been written with the specific 
focus on citizenship, especially dual citizenship. Diez and Squire (2008) combine the 
topics of citizenship and the securitization of migration. The authors argue that citizenship 
traditions are quite stable and diverse citizenship trajectories shape the ways in which 
migration is securitized in different national discourses. They suggest that due to the 
trajectory of the ethnic citizenship definition in accordance with the jus sanguinis- 
principle in Germany “exceptionalism processes of securitisation [of migration] are more 
evident” (Diez and Squire 2008, 572). However, they do not look at how securitization 
processes might play out with regard to (dual) citizenship as such. By looking at the 
securitization of (dual) citizenship, this thesis addresses precisely this gap and applies the 
theory of securitization to analyze the securitization of (dual) citizenship.  
This thesis is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework, 
exploring first the Copenhagen School’s (CS) discursive approach to securitization 
(Buzan et al. 1998) and concepts of boundary-drawing, before examining Didier Bigo’s 
                                                          
5 This thesis refers to naturalized former Turkish/Russian citizens when speaking of naturalized Germans 
that held the Turkish/Russian citizenship before naturalizing and were not allowed to retain their former 
citizenship with naturalization. It speaks of naturalized Turkish-German/Russian-German citizens when 
referring to naturalized Germans that were allowed to keep their Turkish/Russian citizenship with 
naturalization as German citizen.  
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“Management of Unease” (Bigo 2002). As the main focus of this study is on the 
discursive approach to securitization, more room is given to the discursive approach to 
securitization than to Bigo’s practices. Chapter 3 introduces research design and 
methodology, justifies case selection and discusses some of the study’s limitations. The 
empirical part of this thesis follows in Chapter 4 and contains the analysis and discussion. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of the thesis.6 7 
                                                          
6 For reasons of readability everything written in German in this thesis has been adapted to the new German 
orthography.  
7 All German articles were translated by the author herself. 
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2. Theoretical Framework – Securitization Theory 
2.1. Discourses – The Copenhagen School of Securitization 
The CS of securitization consists of a speech act approach to securitization (Buzan et al. 
1998, 26–27). The CS builds on the core assumption that security is not an objective 
condition and that no issue is objectively perceived as threatening. Security is discursively 
constructed (Abrahamsen 2005, 57; Balzacq 2011, 1; Wæver 1995, 405). For issues to be 
perceived as threatening, they have to be construed as “existential threats to a referent 
object by a securitizing actor” (Buzan et al. 1998, 5). The CS’s approach to securitization 
is, thereby, based on a logic of exception (Buzan et al. 1998, 21; Bourbeau 2014, 187; 
Stritzel 2007, 367). It facilitates “the logic of necessity, the narrowing of choice, the 
empowering of a smaller elite” (Wæver 2011, 469).  
Placed on a spectrum the CS distinguishes between nonpoliticized, politicized and 
securitized issues. Nonpoliticized issues are issues that are not dealt with by a state and 
are also not covered within the public. Politicized issues are issues debated publicly and 
are part of the public policy process. Securitized issues, in contrast, are issues exhibited 
as existentially threatening and therefore, need to be dealt with through emergency 
measures (Buzan et al. 1998, 23). The CS’s approach to securitization follows a binary 
logic according to which there either is a case of securitization or no securitization 
(politicized, non-politicized or de-securitized issues) (Bourbeau 2011, 42; Bourbeau 
2014, 192).  
Securitization is characterized by two main features. Firstly, it is conceptualized as a self-
referential practice since it is based on the successful presentation of an issue as 
threatening (Buzan et al. 1998, 24). Secondly, securitization is designed as an 
intersubjective process meaning that the successful presentation of an issue as a threat is 
bound to audience assent (ibid., 25). This means that securitization is only successful if 
the issue presented as existentially threatening is accepted as such by the target audience. 
Lacking audience assent, the attempt of creating securitization can be understood only as 
a securitizing move (ibid., 24–25).  
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A successful securitization is made up of the following three parts (ibid., 25): the 
declaration of an existential threat, the endorsement of emergency action, and an impact 
on interunit relations. The declaration of an existential threat means that an issue is 
presented as threatening. The endorsement implies that the prior declaration has gained 
enough support so that a setting is created from which “it is possible to legitimize 
emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse 
not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return and necessity” (ibid., 25). The 
CS, therefore, implies that the endorsement of emergency action is an integral part of 
securitization. Finally, the impact securitization has on interunit relations is the 
substantial outcome. More specifically, this means that the logic shifts from ‘normal’ 
politics, to exception/emergency. In the CS’s understanding, adhering to the common 
rules is emblematic for the normal, non-securitized way (Floyd 2016, 679). In contrast, 
security means going beyond the normal rules – to exceptionalism – as emblematic for 
security. Exception, the logic of survival, is therefore indicative of security.  
However, Roe is critical of this argument brought forward by the CS. He argues that 
audience support “serves to reveal securitization as a distinct two-stage process: the ‘stage 
of identification’ [(rhetorical securitization)], where an issue is defined as ‘security’, and 
the ‘stage of mobilization’ [(active securitization)], where the responses to that issue are 
thereafter established” (Roe 2008, 620). In Roe’s point of view, this two-stage process 
illustrates the importance of the actual implementation (not only endorsement) of 
emergency measures, in contrast to the CS’s view “that the existential threat has to be 
argued and gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to 
legitimize emergency measures” (Buzan et al. 1998, 25) for securitization to be 
successful. This is relevant for the issue of the securitization of dual citizenship as it 
means that one has to differentiate between the discursive construction of dual citizenship 
as a security issue (rhetorical securitization) and active securitization, in the form of inter 
alia restrictive changes in the citizenship laws or the introduction of policy measures 
trying to limit the numbers of dual citizenship. 
The CS distinguishes between three types of units that are central to the speech act 
approach to securitization; the referent objects, the securitizing actors and functional 
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actors. Referent objects refer to the entity that is claimed to be threatened. Securitizing 
actors are agents who declare an issue to be threatening through a securitizing move. 
Functional actors are agents capable of affecting the dynamics of a security sector (Buzan 
et al. 1998, 35–36). Further important units are referent subjects and the audience. 
Referent subjects point to a threatening entity, in contrast to the referent objects which 
constitute the items presented as existentially threatened (Balzacq 2005, 173–177; Vuori 
2008, 70). Since, as mentioned above, securitization is conceptualized as an 
intersubjective process that depends not only on the securitizing actor who is carrying out 
a securitizing move by the utterance of security (coercion), but also on the target audience 
by either approving of or rejecting the securitization move (consent) – the audience is a 
crucial unit of the securitization process as well (Buzan et al. 1998, 25–31; Balzacq 2005, 
184–185; Balzacq 2011, 8–9; Salter 2008, 321–322; Stritzel 2007, 363). 
Besides actors, facilitating conditions that means the adherence to “(1) the internal, 
linguistic-grammatical” (Buzan et al. 1998, 32) and to “(2) the external, contextual and 
social” (ibid., 32) conditions also play an important role. According to the CS, the 
internal, linguistic-grammatical conditions are the most significant facilitating conditions 
for securitization to be successful. The internal, linguistic grammatical conditions refer to 
a grammar of security, the necessity to follow established linguistic and grammatical 
structures inherent to the security sector (ibid., 33). Stritzel (2012, 554–555) as well as 
Stritzel and Chang (2015, 550–551) operationalize the linguistic and grammatical 
structures of the securitizing speech acts according to the generic structure of (1) claim, 
(2) warning, (3) demand, and (4) propositional content. Accordingly, their typology of 
securitizing speech acts consists of the articulation of (1) a possible existential threat 
(empirical contextualization: account of the threat), (2) the realization of this threat, 
should inaction prevail (empirical contextualization: delineation of the outcome of 
inaction), (3) a call for action  (empirical contextualization: description of a plan of 
action), and (4) evidence and justification of the claim and warning (empirical 
contextualization: presentation of evidence and/or justification (Stritzel 2012, 554–555; 
Stritzel and Chang 2015, 550–551).  
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The external, contextual, and social conditions reflect social conditions, such as the social 
standing of the person speaking security and his or her relationship to the target audience 
(Buzan et al. 1998, 33). Different contexts, furthermore, distinguish themselves in terms 
of “the general grammar of security as such plus the particular dialects” (ibid. 33), which 
is captured by the concept of ‘sectors’. In “Security. A New Framework For Analysis” 
Buzan et al. (1998) differentiate between five security sectors; the military, political, 
economic, environmental and societal sector8. Depending on the sector, the securitizing 
actors’ social capital and position diverges. This means that the relationship between 
securitizing actor and the audience necessary for successful securitization is shaped by 
each sector respectively. Finally, in addition to internal and external conditions, an issue 
that will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 2.1.2., also characteristics of the alleged 
threat are a facilitating condition. Certain characteristics of the purported threat either 
expedite or hinder successful securitization. Linking the alleged threat to items that are 
perceived to be threatening by a large part of the audience increases the likelihood of 
securitization (ibid., 33).  
I am particularly interested in the societal sector as it is of key importance to the topic of 
(dual) citizenship. Societal security is concerned with individual as well as collective 
identities and the question of belonging to a community and the self-understanding of 
communities respectively (Buzan et al. 1998, 119–120). While societal security is, 
thereby, closely linked to political security, and identities and feelings of belonging are 
oftentimes interwoven with the political organizing principle of governments, it is, 
nevertheless, a distinct form of security (ibid., 119–120). Securitization in the societal 
sector, therefore, equalizes to the securitization of identities. Security action is, in general, 
mostly introduced toward and in the name of a collectivity (ibid., 36). Certain imagined 
communities or groups are depicted as threatened by divergent dynamics, inter alia by 
distinct cultures, economic integration or movement of people (Williams 2003, 513). 
Thereby, the focus of attention is implicitly on the ‘own’ community or ‘in-group’ by 
situating it in an existentially inimical environment. “By making the dangerous quality of 
                                                          
8 There are discussions on the expansion of these list of sectors, e.g. if gender and religion should be 
distinguished from the societal sector (Albert and Buzan 2011). 
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certain ‘external’ developments the issue of debate, securitization shields its autonomy 
and unity from being questioned” (Huysmans 2006, 49). Thus, securitization in the 
societal sector has a unifying power, the image of a homogenous and harmonious in-
group is upheld, asserted and reproduced by delineating it from an outside Other. For 
instance, by conjuring up an Islamic threat to Europe and the West, a Western cultural 
identity of unity is enhanced (ibid., 49–52). 
The most significant referent objects of societal security are those groups that “carry the 
loyalties and devotion of subjects in a form and to a degree that can create a socially 
powerful argument that this ‘we’ is threatened; as to its identity” (Buzan et al. 1998, 123; 
emphasis in the original). Most commonly, these referent objects are “tribes, clans, 
nations, civilizations, religions and race” (ibid., 123). As scholars (Bhandar 2010, 331–
333; Huysmans 2006, 48; Stolcke 1995, 8) have argued an issue that has been gaining 
prominence in regard to societal security is culture. Cultural identity and cultural 
distinctiveness play a crucial role in discussions about immigration, transmigration, 
multiculturalism and citizenship (Bhandar 2010, 332; Huysmans 2006, 51). A cultural 
Other is constructed as a potential threat to the in-group’s “national-cum-cultural 
uniqueness and integrity” (Stolcke 1995, 8). Regarding (dual) citizenship, the logic of 
cultural identity and distinctiveness is frequently employed to construct cultural similarity 
as a vital precondition for access to citizenship rights (ibid., 8).  
To successfully securitize an issue within the societal sector thus “involves precisely the 
capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity, to oppose it to what it is not, to cast 
this as a relationship of threat or even enmity, and to have this decision and declaration 
accepted by a relevant group” (Williams 2003, 519–520; emphasis in the original). The 
nation is such a group.  
2.1.1 Boundary-drawing and citizenship 
Benedict Anderson defines the nation as “imagined political community” (Anderson 
1991, 6). The imagined community is built on perceptions of who belongs and who does 
not belong to this shared community. It is therefore constructed and reinforced in 
processes of boundary-drawing (Simonsen 2016, 1154).  Representations of citizenship 
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form an integral part of the construction of national identity. Citizenship is a concept 
based on membership. “The citizen is imagined – and inscribed – as a legitimate member 
of the imagined national community, particularly as nations are enacted and 
institutionalised by states” (Clarke et al. 2014, 108). From a group’s internal viewpoint, 
citizenship has a binary role, it differentiates insiders from outsiders. Taking on an 
external point of view, citizenship does not only differentiate between those inside and 
outside of the imagined community but furthermore distinguishes similar groups by 
marking the boundaries between them. In relational terms, citizenship as membership 
either links an individual or group to a larger social construct in processes of inclusion or 
isolates an individual or group from that social entity in processes of exclusion (Bauböck 
2017, 65).  
Membership boundaries can be bright or blurry boundaries depending on how difficult it 
is for individuals to cross them. Bright boundaries clearly differentiate between those who 
belong and those who do not belong. The boundaries are unmistakable, and individuals 
know their position in regard to the boundaries. The positioning of individuals draws on 
and reflects zones of self-representation. In the case of blurred boundaries, boundaries are 
not markedly distinct (Alba 2005, 22). According to Bauböck (2017, 67), it is precisely 
forms of converging membership, such as quasi-, semi-9 and plural memberships that 
challenge drawn boundaries as the types of membership blur the boundaries between 
social entities. “Yet, as Bauböck has argued, even in these cases an internally binary 
distinction continues to provide the hard core without which the very concept of 
membership loses its purpose” (ibid., 67). That means demarcation processes remain at 
play by juxtaposing an internal core group with the Other inside the membership 
boundaries. This means that exclusion does not occur only at the borders, i.e. state 
borders, but it occurs also within, i.e. inside the state/society. This creates the Other 
within. This is precisely this thesis’ focus when investigating the citizenship debate and 
the securitization of (dual) citizenship. 
                                                          
9 Bauböck conceptualizes quasi-members as individuals who receive some of the benefits and carry out 
some of the duties connected to membership while not being recognized as member, inter alia denizens. 
Semi-members, in contrast, are recognized members that are stripped of some of their rights and 
obligations, inter alia non-resident citizens (Bauböck 2017, 66). 
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The definition of these internal boundaries depends on the type of citizenship 
representation. “Although all citizenship criteria are inwardly inclusive and outwardly 
exclusive […], there are large differences in the inclusiveness of ethnic, civil and cultural 
citizenship criteria” (Reijerse et al. 2013, 614). Ethnic citizenship representation defines 
the national ingroup as a primordial community of common descent. This representation 
is derived from the jus sanguinis principle of nation-building. An inherently exclusionist 
nature underlies this form of citizenship representation. Civic citizenship representation 
defines the national ingroup as a community joined by the common adherence to a social 
contract comprised of a set of shared rules and values. This representation is derived from 
the jus soli principle of nation-building (ibid., 612–614). This form of citizenship 
representation is oftentimes said to be of an inclusive nature since it is quite easy for 
immigrants to fulfill civic citizenship criteria (Meeus et al. 2010, 307; Reijerse et al. 2013, 
615). David Scott Fitzgerald, however, emphasizes that “while it is true that there is an 
inherent tension between the abstract principles of jus soli and an ethnonational 
understanding of the nation, governments have found many ways to resolve this tension 
in ways that are blatantly racist” (2017, 138), as an example he refers to the historical 
United States (ibid., 138). Furthermore, official citizenship status does not automatically 
go hand in hand with the majority group members’ acceptance of one as fellow citizen. 
Since citizenship is perceived subjectively by the majority group members, large 
discrepancies between the official citizenship regime and the majority groups members’ 
citizenship criteria can exist (Reijerse et al. 2013, 612–613). One has to therefore 
differentiate between formal and informal recognition of one’s membership status. One 
might have attained the legal citizenship status, while lacking the informal recognition 
by the majority group members (Bauböck 2017, 65). For the securitization of citizenship, 
this means that despite formal recognition of membership status internal boundaries can 
be drawn – through securitization – in accordance with the type of citizenship 
representation. The type of citizenship representation thereby provides the discursive 
resources upon which securitizing actors can draw and to which the audience responds.  
As culture has become a key argument within the sector of societal security, culture has 
similarly gained in importance regarding citizenship representations (Bhandar 2010, 331–
333; Stolcke 1995, 8). Since the Second World War negative racial and ethnic 
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discrimination in citizenship regimes across European countries have largely become 
illegitimate. This is largely true for positive racial and ethnic discrimination as well. 
However, some positive racial and ethnic preferences have remained in force. Positive 
discrimination is mostly framed as legitimate based on family and cultural ties (Fitzgerald 
2017, 144). Similarly, outgroup discrimination is no any longer based on ethnicity and 
race, instead negative outgroup attitudes focus on the protection of culture. Liav Orgad 
(2015, 112; 2017, 351) argues that a restrictive turn or more specifically cultural turn is 
currently taking place across European states. This is most apparent due to the rise of 
policies directed at the protection of various forms and aspects of national. He also terms 
these policies “cultural defense policies” (Orgad 2017, 351). His point is reinforced by 
Reijerse et al.’s (2013, 615) conceptualization of cultural citizenship representation. 
According to Reijerse et al. cultural citizenship representation presents the nation as a 
culturally monolithic construct. This form of citizenship representation perceives 
immigrants as a threat to the maintenance of the majority group members’ culture. To 
preserve cultural homogeneity immigrants are expected to assimilate to the majority 
culture (ibid., 615). For the securitization of citizenship this means that the understanding 
of citizenship is not the core of internal boundary-drawing processes, but rather ‘culture’ 
is. Boundary-drawing delineates and reinforces the understanding of what – and who – is 
part of this culture and who is not.  
Boundary-drawing, particularly in respect to national identity, is contingent on historical 
conditions (Simonsen 2016, 1157). “The construction of immigrant-native boundaries is, 
in each society, a path-dependent process that hinges on the materials available in the 
social-structural, cultural, legal, and other institutional domains of the receiving society, 
as well as on the characteristics and histories that the immigrants themselves present” 
(Alba 2005, 41). This implies that boundaries differ in character depending on a society’s 
history and context. According to Simonsen (2016, 1169) it is likely that a discursive 
path-dependency persists even after changes in the citizenship regime. Regarding the 
German citizenship regime, this would mean that even after the introduction of jus soli-
elements into the German ethnocultural citizenship regime in 1999 and 2014 (Green 
2005, 942), one could expect to find articulations of boundary-drawing that adhere to the 
logic of inclusion and exclusion of ethnic citizenship representations in the German 
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citizenship discourse. However, as argued above, ethnocultural representations of 
citizenship have become largely illegitimate across European states. As a consequence of 
the Second World War, this holds true for Germany in particular. Therefore, if a path-
dependent process is at play, arguments in the German citizenship discourse should rather 
be fashioned in accordance with a cultural representation of citizenship.  
2.1.2 Boundary-drawing and the securitization of citizenship 
Holger Stritzel strongly criticizes the internalist position that the CS takes. Taking an 
externalist position himself, Stritzel highlights the importance of the wider discursive 
context that empowers or disempowers both the securitizing actor and the speech act 
(Stritzel 2007, 359–367). He further specifies that the securitizing actor and speech act 
are only relevant and only have a meaningful impact on interunit relations if the situation 
renders them important. He advances a conceptualization of securitization as a “dynamic 
three-layered triangle of text, context, and positional power” (ibid., 368). Stritzel 
differentiates between the socio-linguistic dimension of context, which he characterizes 
as quite flexible, and the socio-political dimension of context, which he sees as less fluid 
and more sedimented.  
 
The socio-linguistic dimension of context refers to systems of essential principals of 
behavior and narratives that a linguistic act is embedded in. By drawing on the socio-
linguistic dimension of context in the process of framing their points, actors can render 
the socio-linguistic context useful as a reservoir of metaphors and comparisons (ibid., 
369–370). Regarding the issue of immigration and (dual) citizenship, the socio-linguistic 
context refers to meanings of immigration and citizenship and is closely linked to the 
construction of national identity, and integration policies in public debates across 
countries of immigration. The (non)integration or failed integration of immigrants, the 
compatibility of immigrant culture and religion with the majority culture, cross-border 
ties, national loyalty, and transnational political claims-making of migrants all play a 
crucial role in the process of constructing the meaning of immigration and (dual) 
citizenship in Germany, and countries of immigration in Europe and North America (Faist 
and Ulbricht 2015, 189). In addition, unemployment, the reduction in state aid, and 
terrorism are issues that have been linked to migration, integration, and citizenship across 
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time and space (ibid., 203). If securitization actors can mobilize this context, the audience 
is more likely to consent to the securitization move. The success of the securitization of 
citizenship, thus, also depends on how a particular group is placed within that context, 
and on what discursive resources can be mobilized to securitize this group.  
 
The socio-political context reflects socio-political hierarchies and orders that legitimize 
certain actors and grant them the power to impact upon the construction of meaning. 
Usually these contexts are highly asymmetric and therefore favor certain actors over 
others (Stritzel 2007, 369–370). Looking, for instance, at the religious institutional 
context in Germany, one big difference in the socio-political context is the fact that 
Christian churches and the Jewish community hold the status of a “corporation of public 
law” (ibid. 190), while there is no Muslim organization that enjoys the same status. 
Benefits connected to the status are, inter alia, the possibility to conduct religious 
education in public schools, to levy taxes, and to hold an office in public mass media 
programming and control boards. While action has been taken to organizationally 
incorporate organized Islam in Germany, the religious institutional set-up is still highly 
asymmetric and in this regard disadvantages the Muslim community within Germany. It 
reflects the fact that Islam’s position in Germany is still highly contested, as is the position 
of people associated with Islam – mainly people of Turkish origin or with a Turkish 
migration background – within or outside the imagined community (Faist and Ulbricht 
2015, 190–197).  
 
The performative power of threat texts is able to complement or alter the discourse 
conditions and thus reshape current power relations. Stritzel introduces acts of translation 
into the security literature which are, as he argues, always part of incorporating threats 
into the existing discourse. The more the articulated threats resonate with the existing 
discourses and the better the securitizing actors’ position of power, the likelier it is that 
this threat is subsumed into the dominant narrative. This means that presenting something 
as a threat works better if it resonates with discursively established tropes (Stritzel 2007, 
370–373). Common tropes in German discourse that are relevant to this study include the 
‘sociocultural backwardness’ of people of Muslim origin and their ‘unwillingness to 
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integrate’ (c.f. Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 201; Fouroutan 2013, 6). Furthermore, people of 
Muslim origin are linked to ‘fanaticism’, ‘intolerance’ and ‘non-democracies’ (Foroutan 
2013, 6).  The concept of German Leitkultur (guiding culture) introduced into German 
discourse by conservative Christian Democrats, largely a strategic concept, draws on 
these tropes by implicitly juxtaposing German culture with that of Islam. It demands the 
adaptive capacity of German society and simultaneously seeks to strengthen national 
identity. At the same time, it implicitly constructs Islam as potential danger to the social, 
cultural, and political integrity of the national community (Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 198–
204). Therefore, threat texts that try to establish Islam as, for instance, a cultural danger 
can be expected to succeed quite easily as they resonate with existing discourse. 
 
Similarly to Stritzel, Balzacq emphasizes the dependency of successful securitization on 
the context. Security articulations need to be linked to their environment to be successful. 
It is the context that enables and restrains specific characteristics of the concept (Balzacq 
2005, 184). One key contextual aspect is the question “which heuristic artifacts shall a 
securitizing actor use to create (or effectively resonate with) the circumstances that will 
facilitate the mobilization of the audience – analogies, metaphors, metonymies, emotions, 
stereotypes?” (ibid., 179).  
 
The CS’s discursive approach to securitization centers on a speech act approach to 
securitization. Securitization is conceptualized as the construction of an existential threat 
following a logic of exception. Securitization is characterized as self-referential practice 
and an intersubjective process. In accordance with Roe (2008, 620) securitization can be 
divided into a two-stage process of rhetorical (stage of identification) and active 
securitization (stage of mobilization). The societal security sector, that is of upmost 
importance to the topic of (dual) citizenship, is concerned with questions of belonging to 
a community and the self-perception of communities. A perceived ‘We’ or in-group, i.e. 
a nation, is constructed as threatened. Cultural identity and cultural distinctiveness have 
become of key importance in debates on immigration and (dual) citizenship within the 
societal sector. A cultural Other is constructed as potential threat to the ‘We’ or in-group. 
Importantly, exclusionary processes take place not only outside, but also within 
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membership boundaries; creating the Other within. Such boundary-drawing processes are 
expected to be more successful if securitizing actors actively utilize and mobilize relevant 
socio-linguistic and socio-political dimensions of context.  
2.2. Practices – Bigo’s Management of Unease 
In stark contrast to the CS’s logic of exception, Didier Bigo’s approach to securitization 
centers on a logic of routine (Bourbeau 2014, 188). Bigo conceptualizes securitization as 
the everyday practices of bureaucracies, a continuum shaped by the employment of 
administrative practices, technologies of surveillance and territorial protection by security 
professionals. He emphasizes that the key to understanding the operating modes of 
discourses of securitization is a better comprehension of the routines that the process of 
securitization is embedded within. Bigo refers to these routines of securitization as the 
“management of unease” (Bigo 2002, 64)., which nowadays is ever closer linked to the 
“globalisation of insecurity” (Bigo 2006, 389; Bigo 2008, 12–13). Security, as it is 
understood nowadays, comprises both national and international interpretations of 
security. This convergence of the understanding of security is especially relevant 
regarding the topic of migration. Furthermore, the securitization of immigration is the 
outcome of the technological advancement of the techniques of control and surveillance 
and not the other way around (Bigo 2002, 73; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008, 5; McDonald 
2008, 570). This is closely intertwined with the development of “computerization, risk 
profiling, visa policy, remote control borders, creation of international or nonterritorial 
zones in airports, and so on” (Bigo 2002, 73). Focusing solely on discourses to understand 
the operating principles and mechanisms of securitization leads to an underestimation of 
the significant role of routines that are crucial to securitization (Bigo 2002, 73–74; Bigo 
and Tsoukala 2008, 5). 
 
It is particularly interesting to analyze naturalization routines and changes in 
naturalization routines when examining the securitization of (dual) citizenship through 
the prism of Bigo’s definition. As Liav Orgad points out, “the law of naturalization 
functions as one gatekeeper – it is designed to include the desirable people and exclude 
the undesirable ones” (2017, 337). Naturalization routines mirror the self-understanding 
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of the in-group – the ‘We’ – at present and in the future. Furthermore, naturalization 
policies define the criteria for ‘good’ outsiders that are eligible to naturalization. 
Moreover, they contain the content and central elements to which these outsiders must 
subscribe to become part of the in-group. Naturalizations can thus be understood as a 
form of nation-building. Alongside other measures, such as national holidays and 
citizenship ceremonies, they are meant to enhance a feeling of belonging and unify the 
in-group around this communality (Orgad 2015, 87).  
 
Naturalization routines and laws, as well as citizenship representations more generally, 
reflect the perceived nature of the in-group. Most communities rely on a combination of 
the three above-discussed ideal-typical conceptions of community; primordial, civic, and 
cultural. Transnational law, economic factors, and cultural considerations nowadays 
severely influence and shape the ideas behind naturalization routines and laws. 
Importantly, openness of admission criteria to citizenship should not be equalized to 
liberalization in access to citizenship status. While a current trend has been the relaxation 
of naturalization laws, largely based on economic and demographic necessities, a 
restrictive term or more specifically cultural turn has simultaneously taken place. Besides 
an increase in the application of criminal law in immigration control and in the 
naturalization process, one important trend indicative of this restrictive turn is the 
adoption of cultural integration requirements. These requirements, also termed “cultural 
defense policies” by Orgad (2017, 351), are aimed at the protection of various forms and 
aspects of national culture across European states. Cultural defense policies are grounded 
in five mechanisms: (1) citizenship tests, (2) language requirements, (3) loyalty oaths, (4) 
attachment requirements, and (5) integration contracts (Orgad 2015, 86; Orgad 2017, 
351).  
 
Empirical findings sustain the argument of a restrictive turn that has been taking place 
across European countries. The numbers of European states that have a compulsory 
language requirement have risen, citizenship tests have become the norm and integration 
pacts as well as loyalty oaths have become common within the last twenty years 
(Extramiana and Avermaet 2011; Goodman 2010; Orgad 2015; 112–113; Orgad 2017, 
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351–352). Thus, naturalization routines across Europe have changed tremendously. In 
countries, where the principle of avoidance of dual citizenship still prevails it is 
interesting to investigate, if this principle is upheld and if or how the praxis of awarding 
dual citizenship as part of the naturalization process differs.  
 
By focusing on practices of securitization and discursive securitization when studying 
processes of securitization and boundary-drawing, this study aims at having a broader 
focus. In order to grasp the actual dynamics of the actual boundaries that are drawn in 
practice in routine naturalization practices, we have to look at those practices themselves 
and not just at discursive practices. Applying both approaches, the logic of routine and 
the logic of exception, alongside each other makes it possible to combine insights gained 
from the study of both the discourses and practices of securitization. Furthermore, 
comparing the securitizing discourses and practices can provide an understanding of how 
everyday practices and discourses differ from one another or complement one another 
(Bourbeau 2014, 188; Léonard 2010, 236).  
25 
 
3. Research design and Methodology  
Securitization theory is concerned with the discursive construction of threats. The CS 
asserts that security can be studied discursively, therefore I rely on discourse analysis.  
Discourse can be defined “as a particular way of talking about and understanding the 
world or an aspect of the world” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 1; emphasis in original). 
Or as Dunn and Neumann put it, “a discourse [is] a system of meaning-production that 
fixes meaning, however temporarily, and enables actors to make sense of the world and 
to act within it” (2016, 17–18; emphasis in original). Discourses act as systems of 
meaning and thus can be dealt with as a kind of data for analysis. The more so as 
discourses produce and reproduce social realities through meaning construction. 
Therefore, it is key to scrutinize the construction of meaning as part of the social fabric. 
By means of language, discourses produce and reproduce background capacities for 
people to distinguish and determine subjects and objects ascribing upon them attributes 
and values and position them in relation to other objects (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 43). 
In line with the CS’s poststructuralist understanding and conceptualization of discourse, 
this thesis conducts a poststructuralist discourse analysis. The analysis is based upon 
Dunn and Neumann’s (2016) and Hansen’s (2006) approach to studying discourse. Like 
all poststructuralist discourse analysts, they take the position that “everything can be read 
as text” (Dunn and Neumann 2016, 39; emphasis in original). That means that in contrast 
to Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 2003) which differentiates between a 
discursive and a non-discursive realm, Dunn and Neumann, as well as Hansen, emphasize 
that there is no extra-discursive realm. “That does not mean that nothing but text and talk 
exists, but, on the contrary, that discourse itself is material and that entities such as the 
economy, the infrastructure, and institutions are also parts of discourse” (Jorgensen and 
Phillips 2002, 19). Hence, our world is understood as fully constituted by discourse (Dunn 
and Neumann 2016, 17; Jorgensen and Phillips 2002, 19; Hansen 2006, 18). Therefore, 
the world and all its different aspects can be studied through the lenses of discourse 
analysis. 
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Hansen (2006, 18–19) understands language as political. This means that language is “a 
site for the production and reproduction of particular subjectivities and identities while 
others are simultaneously excluded” (ibid., 18–19). Hansen exemplifies her point by 
referring to the construction of women in nineteenth century Europe. At that time, women 
were perceived as inter alia motherly, emotional, and unable to understand complex 
political and financial issues. Through this construction of female identity the political 
involvement of women was seen as unfit or even dangerous. This understanding of female 
identity was understood as objectively true and was reified through language use that 
supported the superiority of males as political subjects.  
Identity-construction is always closely linked and facilitated by a simultaneous account 
of something different or ‘Other.’ By juxtaposing two characteristics, a privileged and a 
devalued one, identity is constructed relationally and along two dimensions. “It is 
constructed through a series of juxtaposed signs, to be a woman in nineteenth century 
discourse is to be different from – and inferior to – being a man, it is to be emotional 
rather than rational, […] and to be focused on the simple rather than the complex” (ibid., 
19). Hence, identity construction is intrinsically linked to two processes, the process of 
linking and the process of differentiation (ibid., 19). The process of linking characterizes 
“nineteenth century European women” as motherly, emotional, and unable to 
comprehend complex issues. The process of differentiation juxtaposes the series of 
female characteristics to the male series of characteristics (ibid., 19). The process of 
differentiation establishes Othering/ “degrees of Otherness” (ibid. 37). However, 
representations as well as processes of linking and differentiation are never absolutely 
fixed. Since language is both structured and unstable, changes in discursive identity-
construction are always possible, but rather difficult, as discourses seek to construct 
themselves as steady (ibid., 20–21).   
Dunn and Neumann also stress the importance that representations play within discourse, 
particularly because they can have severe political repercussions. Representations are 
fabrications based on language. However, representations are not indifferent or harmless 
signifiers as they empower “actors to ‘know’ the object and to act upon what they ‘know’” 
(Dunn and Neumann 2016, 60). Thus, representations prepare the ground for certain types 
of action within distinct discourses, while they bar the way for other types of action in the 
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same discourses (ibid., 60). This is of high importance for the question of representations 
of migrants in German discourse, as these representations will entail social consequences. 
They define the conditions of how these groups will be treated.  
This thesis focuses on representations of dual citizenship and dual citizens within German 
discourse. It seeks to analyze the center-right discourse on dual citizenship to explore 
whether this discourse securitized dual citizenship, and to explore whether there is in fact 
one or several competing discourses. In regard to representations of dual citizenship, 
particular attention is given to the representations of Turkish-German and Russian-
German dual citizenship/dual citizens with the aim to identify how those representations 
feed into the securitizing elements identified in (parts of) the center-right discourse on 
dual citizenship.  Focusing on the processes of linking and differentiation, the thesis 
investigates which attributes are linked to the identity of Turkish-German and Russian-
German dual citizens and what processes of Othering are involved in the construction of 
each representation respectively. How do the characteristics attributed to Turkish-German 
and Russian-German dual citizens differ? How does the process of Othering differ; which 
“degrees of Otherness” (Hansen 2006, 37, c.f. Diez 2005) are involved? How are these 
processes of Othering reflected in the naming of the groups, e.g. usage of hyphenation or 
not (e.g., Baban 2006, 189)?  
In order to investigate differences in representations of Turkish-German and Russian-
German dual citizenship/dual citizens, this study look at discursive mechanisms that 
facilitate the respective representations. Faist and Ulbricht (2015, 200) highlight the 
importance of (1) symbolic exclusion, (2) culturalist ranking, and (3) generalization 
(homogenization) as discursive mechanisms through which the identity of ‘Turkish-
Germans’ and ‘Russian-Germans’ are constructed in relation to the predominant 
‘German’ identity in the process of boundary-drawing. (1) Symbolic exclusions operate 
mainly through the devaluation of cultural belief patterns connected with migrants and 
through the ‘up valuation’ of those connected to ‘native’ Germans, thereby establishing 
a (2) culturalist ranking. Cultural rankings enhance the categorization of various groups 
of migrants between migrant groups. Faist and Ulbricht exemplify this, by showing that 
transnationality is understood as highly acceptable and advantageous for highly skilled 
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aliens or citizens, but considered as indicative for exclusion regarding labor migrants in 
German discourse. (3) Generalization refers to the construction of a certain group, for 
instance the ‘category of Muslims’ as a comparatively monolithic community. 
Generalization is oftentimes closely linked to processes of devaluation and exclusion 
(Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 200–201). The following study analyses how these mechanisms 
play out in the discourse on Turkish-German and Russian-German dual citizenship/dual 
citizens within Germany. 
Drawing on the above-mentioned mechanisms this thesis thus aims to firstly investigate 
the securitization of the center-right discourse on dual citizenship/dual citizens in 
Germany, before examining the difference in the representation/securitization of dual 
citizenship/dual citizens by comparison across two cases. For this end, a comparative 
analysis of the center-right discourse on Turkish-German and Russian-German dual 
citizenship/dual citizens is conducted.  Turkish-German and Russian-German dual 
citizens are the largest groups of Germans that hold a second non-EU citizenship (c.f. 
footnote 2). While dual citizenship is legally accepted for EU and Swiss nationals in 
Germany by enactment since 2007, dual citizenship for non-EU citizens and third country 
nationals is still mostly prohibited by law. Arguments against dual citizenship, such as 
military service of men in the country of one’s second citizenship, dual allegiance, or the 
fifth column-argument, are all cited in the case of Turkey and Russia. This is particularly 
relevant since 2014, as a rift in relations between Russia and Germany as well as between 
Turkey and Germany has taken place. However, this thesis expects a difference in the 
securitization of German-Turkish and German-Russian dual citizenship/dual citizens due 
to different discursive contextual factors, such as the integration and the compatibility of 
the immigrant culture and religion with the majority culture of these two groups, that are 
at play in the debate on dual citizenship within Germany. Therefore, this thesis seeks to 
answer the question if and how the debate on dual citizenship is securitized and how 
representations of those groups feed-into (or do not feed-into) the securitization of dual 
citizenship.  
In order to compare and contrast the securitization of dual citizenship/dual citizens in the 
German center-right discourse, this thesis analyzes news articles. In order to retrieve these 
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articles, this analysis utilized the FAZ-archive10. The non-tabloid newspaper FAZ was 
selected based on the widely read criteria (Hansen 2006, 85). Even though the national 
daily non-tabloid newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) has a higher circulation than the 
FAZ, the FAZ is the leading national daily non-tabloid print newspaper across 
geographical Germany, while the SZ’s readership is mostly located in Southern Germany 
(Schröder 2016)11. The FAZ can be said to have the most geographically diverse 
readership and has, therefore, a key role in defining and shaping nationwide discourses. 
The FAZ is a center-right, liberal-conservative national daily German newspaper. The 
FAZ displays the discourse at the center of German society and maps the discourse that 
is especially relevant for those shaping policy in Germany. While the FAZ offers the 
above-mentioned advantages, relying on the FAZ as the sole medium when analyzing the 
securitization of dual citizenship also imposes limitations. Analyzing the highly 
circulated tabloid-newspaper BILD as well as regional newspapers in addition to the FAZ 
would add additional insights into how the discourse varies across different social strata 
of society, especially regarding which discourse – securitized or non-securitized – is 
dominant in the entire society, or across regions (the latter being particularly interesting 
in the context of current debates of the ‘xenophobic east’). However, due to the 
constraints of this study, collecting and analyzing the data of all these sources would have 
been too time consuming and costly. 
Moreover, in order to study the discursive securitization across the two cases, the analysis 
is divided into four ‘high intensity moments’. These periods are determined based on 
Hansen’s (2006, 78) argument that “studies of ‘comparative moments’ evolve around a 
smaller number of clearly defined points in time” (2006, 78). In a first step, a timeline 
                                                          
10 The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitungs-archive can be found at https://www.faz-biblionet.de/faz-portal. It 
can be accessed via the Bayrische StaatsBibliothek (Bavarian National Library). 
11 In the first quarter of 2018, the circulation numbers of the FAZ amounted to 240,000 copies sold (45,000 
of it as e-papers). The circulation numbers of the FAZ Sunday paper reached 252,000 copies sold (47,000 
thereof as e-papers). According to the Allensbach market and advertising media analysis, both FAZ and 
FAZ Sunday paper reach more than 850,000 readers per copy sold as all copies are read by three or more 
people on average (FAZ 2018). The Süddeutsche Zeitung has higher circulation numbers amounting to 
352,573 copies sold (Statista 2018), however, the Süddeutsche Zeitung’s readership is mainly concentrated 
in the Southern regions of Germany (Schröder 2016). 
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(see figure 1, 32) starting with the September 1st, 1998 until the August 31st, 2017 was 
constructed that identified two ‘high intensity moments’, each of which consist of events 
of general importance regarding the issue of (dual) citizenship in Germany. Texts were 
selected based on the two identified periods around which political and media activity 
was particularly intense (Hansen 2006, 88–90). The time of evaluation is subdivided into 
two periods of general importance: the first period from September 1st, 1998 –May 31st, 
1999 and the second period from September 1st, 2013 –December 31st, 2014. The first 
period, therefore, starts shortly before the German federal elections on September 27th, 
1998, includes the campaign against dual citizenship in the Bundesland (federal state) of 
Hesse organized in 1998/1999 which was closely linked to the state election in Hesse on 
February 7th, 1999 and ends shortly after the passing of a new citizenship bill introducing 
the ‘option model’12 into German citizenship law in May 1999. The second period starts 
shortly before the German federal elections on September 22nd, 2013 and ends shortly 
after the abolition of the ‘option-model’ on December 20th, 2014. The text corpus was 
compiled by using a keyword search, including the key words ‘Doppelte 
Staatsbürgerschaft’ (dual citizenship), ‘Doppelte Staatsangehörigkeit’ (dual citizenship), 
‘Doppelpass’ (holding two passport) and ‘Optionspflicht’.  
In a second step, ‘high intensity moments’ for the discussion of dual citizenship focusing 
on the group of Turkish-German and Russian-German dual citizenship/dual citizens were 
identified. For this purpose, the above-mentioned keyword search was itemized by 
combining these keywords with ‘Türk*’ (e.g. Turkish, Turkey, of Turkish background 
etc.) or ‘Russ*’ (e.g. Russian, Russia etc.). However, as the initial search did not yield 
any insightful articles on Russian-German dual citizenship/dual citizens13 the search was 
as a consquence broadened to include articles on the group of ‘Russlanddeutsche’ 
                                                          
12 In accordance with the ‘option model’ children born to foreign parents in Germany are granted two 
citizenships by birth. They were then allowed to retain both citizenships until the age of 23, when they had 
to choose between the two citizenships. In 2014 the ‘option model’ was revised and since then children 
born to parents of third countries in Germany are also released from the ‘option obligation’ (if they are 
fulfilling certain conditions). 
13 References to Russian-German dual citizens are marginal in the discourse on dual citizenship in 
Germany, and mostly refer the numbers of Russian-German dual citizens only.  
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(Russian-Germans) and ‘(Spät-)Aussiedler’ ((late) resettlers)14 15 a by looking at periods 
around which political and media activity in regard to Russlanddeutschen/(Spät)-
Aussiedler was particularly fierce. Due to historical facts, many of the so-called 
Russlanddeutschen/(Spät)-Aussiedler either hold dual citizenship or have the right to dual 
citizenship (Green 2005, 926–927). Regarding Turkish-German dual citizenship/dual 
citizens I identified one such high intensity moment in which identity is represented most 
clearly. This high intensity moment surrounds the event of the constitutional referendum 
held on April 16th, 2017 that enabled 1.43 million Turkish citizens living in Germany to 
vote. The period of investigation is from the March 1st, 2017 until August 31st, 2017 
searching for the key words ‘Doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft’ (dual citizenship), ‘Doppelte 
Staatsangehörigkeit’ (dual citizenship) and ‘Doppelpass’ (holding two passport) and 
‘Turk*’. Regarding Russlanddeutsche/ (Spät)-Aussiedler one period of importance, in 
which the question of identity and belonging to Germany and the German state became 
particularly salient, was identified: the ‘Lisa case’16. Regarding the Lisa-case, the 
following investigation period was selected: 1st of January 2016 until 31st of July 2016 
searching for the keywords ‘Lisa’ and ‘(Spät)-Aussiedler*’ and/or ‘Russlanddeutsch*’. 
In total, 780 articles were selected as most relevant for in-depth analysis of the discourse 
                                                          
14 (Spät)-Aussiedler ((late) resettlers) are ethnic Germans/German nationals (deutsche Volkszugehörige) 
from the successor states of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European States, inter alia from Romania 
and Poland, that immigrated to Germany as part of a special admission procedure. Until 31.12.1992 these 
immigrants are referred to as Aussiedler, starting from the 01.01.1993 as Spätaussiedler. With the 
recognition as Spätaussiedler immigrants automatically acquire German citizenship (BAMF 2018). 
Furthermore, Spätaussiedler do not have to renounce their former citizenship. Therefore, a high share of 
Spätaussiedler hold dual nationality. Out of the group of Spätaussiedler that immigrated from the Russian 
Federation to Germany 26.3 percent hold dual citizenship (BMJ 2018, 2; Worbs et al. 2013, 41–42). 
Russlanddeutsche (Russian-Germans) is a collective term for (Spät-)Aussiedler from the Russian 
Federation but also from other successor states of the Soviet Union that speak Russian as their mother 
tongue (Worbs et al. 2013). 
15 This thesis refers to (Spät-)Aussiedler if the period of immigration is not clearly defined, to Aussiedler if 
the immigration took place before 31.12.1992 and to Spätaussiedler if the immigration took place after 
31.12.1992. 
16 The ‘Lisa case’ refers to a Russian-German girl named Lisa, who was allegedly raped by Arab immigrants 
in January 2016. The ‘Lisa case’ was picked up by Russian media outlets in a fake news campaign and 
ignited protests by the Russian-German community within Germany. 
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on dual citizenship. 30 articles17 were selected as a final corpus according to the criteria 
of ‘add texts until nothing new comes up.’ 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of investigation periods  
After having analyzed the securitization of the discourse on (dual) citizenship the study 
turns to the investigation of securitization of everyday practices of the bureaucracies 
looking at naturalization practices in Germany. This study thus investigates how the 
management of unease plays out in the naturalization practices in Germany. First, general 
trends and changes in naturalization practices are examined focusing on liberalizations 
and restrictions in naturalization laws and practices paying particular attention to the five 
mechanisms that are indicative of deploying cultural defense policies: (1) citizenship 
tests; (2) language requirements; (3) loyalty oaths; (4) attachment requirements; and (5) 
integration contracts (Orgad 2015, 86; Orgad 2017, 351). This thesis then investigates the 
praxis of awarding dual citizenship with naturalizations. General trends in the praxis of 
awarding dual citizenship with naturalizations are analyzed. However, the focus lies on 
naturalized former Turkish and Russian citizens. The praxis is analyzed on German 
national level drawing on the naturalization statistics of the German Federal Statistical 
Office18. This thesis investigates before the background of the discursive construction of 
those groups how the praxis of awarding dual citizenship with naturalizations differs in 
Germany, particularly looking at the cases of naturalized Turkish-German and Russian-
German citizens. Finally, the analysis of the discourse on dual citizenship and the 
representations of Turkish-German and Russian-German dual citizens within the 
                                                          
17 For the investigation period 1 14 articles were selected. For the investigation period 2 7 articles were 
selected. For the investigation period 3 5 articles were selected. For the investigation period 4 4 articles 
were selected. 
18 The webpage of the German Federal Statistical Office can be found at 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Startseite.html.  
1998 1999 2001 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2017
Timeline of investigation periods
high intensity moment 1 high intensity moment 2
high intensity moment 3 high intensity moment 4
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discourse and the analysis of the bureaucratic practices of awarding dual citizenship are 
compared to provide an understanding of how discourse and everyday practice with 
regard to dual citizenship in Germany differ from one another or complement one another.  
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4. Analysis 
Having presented a synopsis of the Copenhagen School’s discursive approach to 
securitization and Didier Bigo’s Management of Unease, this section will firstly present 
the empirical results of the discourse analysis, after which the results of the investigation 
of everyday practices are presented. The main focus of the discourse analysis is on the 
different discourses regarding (dual) citizenship and more specifically, on elements of 
securitization within them. In addition, how Russian-Germans and Turkish-Germans are 
presented as Other, as part of the discourses’ overall narrative underpinning the 
securitizing elements in the discourse on dual citizenship.  
4.1. Analysis I – Discursive Securitization 
Looking at the two periods of evaluation that focus on events of general importance 
regarding the issue of (dual) citizenship in Germany – the first period from September 1st, 
1998 –May 31st, 1999 and the second period from September 1st, 2013 –December 31st, 
2014 – two discourses, one conservative, one liberal discourse, are identified within the 
center-right discourse on (dual) citizenship. It is striking how closely intertwined the 
debates on (dual) citizenship and integration are. A first finding with regard to the center-
right discourse on dual citizenship is that the citizenship debate is being conducted against 
the background of two diametrically opposed understandings of integration: 1) Social 
integration as corner stone for legal integration, that is to say the acquisition of German 
citizenship may only stand at the end of successful social integration; 2) Legal integration 
as cornerstone for social integration, the key stone of this understanding is that legal 
integration should be granted first and forms the ultimate starting point for social 
integration. Drawing on Stritzel and Chang’s (2015, 550–551) above-mentioned 
operationalization of the linguistic and grammatical structures of the securitizing speech 
acts, the conservative discourse “social integration as corner stone for legal integration” 
is outlined subsequently by subdividing it into the generic structure of claim, warning, 
demand, and propositional content.  
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4.1.1 Social integration as corner stone for legal integration – conservative 
discourse 
According to Stritzel and Chang (ibid., 550–551) the claim amounts to the articulation of 
a possible existential threat. The account of this threat within the conservative discourse 
is based on the planned reform of the Law on Citizenship intending to introduce the jus 
solis-principle and the right to hold dual citizenship. This reform is seen as “a complete 
transformation of the basic characteristics of the Law on Citizenship” (Scholz 1999) and 
as such as “revolutionary” (ibid.), “radical” (ibid.) and “disastrous” (ibid.). The Law in 
planning is contrasted with the current Law on Citizenship. The current Law has been the 
tried and tested foundation of the German state. Articles (Böckelmann 1998; Scholz 
1998) highlight that the guidelines of the current Law, in particular the avoidance of 
multiple citizenship and the right to citizenship based on parentage (jus sanguinis), have 
proven their value. Furthermore, it is claimed that these guidelines are the accepted 
standard in most European and also non-European countries (Scholz 1999).  
Hardliners of the conservative discourse even go a step further and argue that the planned 
changes in the Law on Citizenship are a “wrong and dangerous signal” (FAZ 1999a) that 
will cause “a wave of immigration without precedent and with unforeseeable 
consequences” (ibid.). Moreover, they “warn against foreign infiltration 
(Überfremdung)” (FAZ 1999a; FAZ 1999f) that will bring about a “division in society 
that threatens to divide the nation” (FAZ 1999a). By conjuring up “the demise of the 
occident” (ibid.) it becomes clear that the fear of “foreign infiltration” and of “a wave of 
immigration” is a fear directed against foreigners from outside the so-called “occident/the 
Western world”. Edmund Stoiber (at that time Prime Minister of the German state of 
Bavaria) is quoted as saying that the “developments are more dangerous than the terror 
of the Red Army Faction” (ibid.). By linking dual citizens as potential partners of terrorist 
organizations, the (global) security discourse is clearly triggered (ibid.). 
The warning comprises the realization of the threat – in this case the “radical” revision of 
the Law on Citizenship – if inaction prevails. The outcome of inaction is presented as the 
erosion of the foundations of the identity of the German people. According to Scholz 
(1999) “the radical restructuring of the Law on Citizenship corrodes the foundations of 
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the identity of the German constitutive people (radikale Umstruktuierung des 
Staatsangehörigkeitsrechts greift an die Grundlagen der Identität des deutschen 
Staatvolkes)”. This is underlined by the fact that dual citizens can avoid “the national 
community of fate […], in case it does get rough in Germany” (Schmitt 1998; c.f. 
Kielmansegg 2014). These warnings are reinforced by the metaphors employed. The 
planned changes are compared to a “reckless undertaking (Husarenstreich)” (ibid.), that 
cannot be legitimized by a “simple parliamentary majority” (Scholz 1999; c.f. 
Kielmansegg 2014). Furthermore, it is said that naturalizations will from now on be “free 
of charge (zum Nulltarif)” (Scholz 1999; c.f. Böckelmann 1998) and simply serve “the 
survival of the public limited company Germany” (Carstens 2014). “Free of charge”, does 
not actually refer to naturalizations without any financial expenditures for those seeking 
naturalization, but it rather points towards ‘costs’ that arise out of individual efforts to 
integrate.  In deviation from the existing law, a sufficient degree of integration will not 
be a mandatory prerequisite for the acquisition of citizenship any longer (Carstens 2014). 
“Naturalizations are disconnected from verifiable integration into local living conditions, 
in particular from the proof of language capabilities, without which integration into the 
local professional and working world can hardly succeed” (Scholz 1999). That a country 
permits naturalized citizens to hold multiple citizenship, as the planned Law on 
Citizenship intends, “without demanding a special individual determination of the 
naturalization candidate” (Böckelmann 1998) is without precedent throughout the world. 
Thereby, the regulative and integration functions of the Law on Citizenship are dropped. 
The planned Law on Citizenship is of promotional character. It solicits “continuously 
swelling family reunions from the motherland” (ibid.). Here Böckelmann deliberately 
uses the term ‘motherland’, rather than the German language term ‘fatherland’, as he 
directly refers to Turkish immigration. The planned Law on Citizenship stands for “being 
German at reduced prices” (ibid.), it is so to speak bartered away.  
Furthermore, the hardliners point towards “the relinquishment of the most effective threat 
of deportations towards potentially violent foreigners” (ibid.). Here, an instance of 
interdiscursivity takes place as the discourse draws on the case of “Mehmet” (Schmitt 
1998). Mehmet, whose real name is Muhlis Ari, is a Turkish citizen who was born and 
raised in Munich as the son of Turkish parents, and who had been living in Germany for 
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over thirty years. In 1998 as a 14-year old he was deported to Turkey as a juvenile 
offender already having committed over 60 crimes (e.g. robbery, theft, and bodily injury) 
(Burger 2013; Wild 2010). The argumentation of the hardliners is that “Mehmet” could 
not have been deported if the planned Law on Citizenship would have been in force back 
then since he would have had German citizenship, and thereby supporting the claim that 
the powerful tool of deportations will be relinquished. As a result, they indirectly promote 
stigmas and fears of criminal foreigners who will soon enjoy the right to stay in Germany, 
no matter what crimes they commit, due to the planned Law on Citizenship.  
The demand implies a call for action. In this instance, the plan of action is to prevent the 
planned Law of Citizenship from being passed, especially in the intended form. The core 
concern is that legal integration meaning the acquisition of citizenship forms the end of 
successful ex-ante social integration. The planned Law on Citizenship, however, means 
that “a sufficient degree of already completed integration […] shall not be prerequisite 
for the acquisition of German citizenship any longer: In this context also belongs the 
principle of avoiding multiple citizenship” (Scholz 1998). “An effective integration 
policy stands and falls with the willingness of the foreigner […] to wholeheartedly 
identify with our social and constitutional system. For this reason, the acquisition of 
German citizenship has to be the end of integration” (ibid.). This is why dual citizenship 
should not be endorsed as “it thwarts an effective integration policy” (ibid.) since “a clear 
orientation towards the Federal Republic of Germany is impeded or not even demanded 
(Scholz 1998; Kielsmansegg 2014). Thereby, naturalization becomes “arbitrary” (Scholz 
1998). It is requested that naturalizations adhere to strict regulations regarding language 
capabilities, school degrees, previous convictions, loyalty to the constitution and financial 
independence. Also relinquishing the jus sanguinis-principle is seen as at least 
questionable as the principle “follows the natural family membership of a child” 
(Roellecke 1999; c.f. Böckelmann 1998). This is underpinned by the argumentation that 
replacement or supplement of the jus sanguinis-principle through the jus soli-principle 
does not guarantee an effective integration of the child affected. Even more so, as the 
citizenship might be acquired against the parents’ will as the parents must not have a right 
to disclaimer. The absolute minimum that is to be permitted is the ‘option model’, as it is 
indispensable that children make a final decision for or against the German citizenship 
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when coming of age (FAZ 1999d; Roellecke 1999; Scholz 1998). In 2014, it is once more 
strongly highlighted that the ‘option model’ is the absolute acceptable maximum as the 
acceptance of dual citizenship per se means that “Germany is dependent on [other states 
and] Turkey” (Müller 2014a) regarding inter alia military service. This must be avoided 
(Carstens 2014; Kielsmansegg 2014; Müller 2014a). Furthermore, it is emphasized that 
children must opt for or against German citizenship. The decision for one nationality is 
seen as unproblematic and possible without “unsolvable inner conflicts” (Carstens 2014). 
The propositional content provides evidence and justification of the claim and warning. 
The general logic why the law on dual citizenship is considered a threat is because in the 
discourse, the relationship between state and citizens is seen as once characterized by 
mutual obligations and rights. Any fundamental change to the balance of rights and 
obligations alters this relationship, and is therefore a threat to German identity, to the 
German ‘way of life’ (Roellecke 1999; Kielsmansegg 2014; Müller 2014a). Furthermore, 
it is argued that foreign naturalization candidates will be privileged in comparison to their 
German fellow citizens. Important privileges would inter alia be the double voting right, 
the possibility to choose where to fulfill compulsory military service, and a greater 
freedom to travel should visa regulations differ according to citizenship. Another point 
mentioned is the acquisition of ownership that is reserved for nationals in many countries 
and would further privilege dual citizens (Scholz 1998; Roellecke 1999). This privileged 
treatment of dual citizens is not only not in line with the constitutional principle of 
equality but could entail “additional irritation and social upheavals” (Scholz 1998) 
between Germans and non-Germans. Above all, dual citizenship would “lead to frictions 
and conflicts” (Roellecke 1999) that will arise from obligations and rights that result from 
multiple citizenship. Most importantly, citizenship is not only concerned with questions 
of equality and equity, but also has to do with emotions. Citizenship is the “symbol of a 
shared feeling of communality” (ibid.; c.f. Kielsmansegg 2014). It is true that the nation 
cannot be equated with the state and therefore nationality and citizenship also cannot be 
equated. However, while nationality and citizenship do not have to be congruent, there 
should not be too great a disparity between the two (Roellecke 1999).  
The more specific explanation concerns the non-integration of foreigners that will be 
reinforced by granting dual citizenship. The already existing tendency of foreigners to 
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isolate themselves, “to withdraw into their own shells” (FAZ 1999a; c.f. Adam 1999) and 
to live in their own communities following their own laws will be boosted. This will lead 
to a ghettoization that “will promote hatred – from inside to outside and from outside to 
inside” (FAZ 1999c). The discourse warns against “multicultural fantasies” (Adam 1999) 
and against the “statistical perception of the world by politicians” (ibid.) that look at 70 
million Germans facing seven million foreigners in Germany and consequently 
concluding that “there is no need to panic” (ibid.). What these politicians do not see is 
“tipping majority ratios” (Adam 1999; c.f. FAZ 1999f) in for example, schools, streets 
and districts that have been reality for some considerable time already. “The majority 
asserts itself with the result, that the underdogs feel like strangers in their own land” 
(Adam 1999; c.f. FAZ 1999f).  
To sum it up, the threat of the planned Law on Citizenship, specifically its promotion of 
dual citizenship and of the jus soli-principle, materializes in a degradation of the basis of 
the German identity. In line with Faist and Ulbricht’s (2015, 189) findings, this 
degradation of national identity is closely interlocked with the non-integration or failed 
integration of foreigners that poses a risk to German society in form of ghettoization and 
tipping majority ratios. The rhetoric of the conservative discourse stays the same in 2014 
focusing on the detail that the ‘option model’ should under no circumstances be abolished. 
Moreover, in 2014, the topic of terrorism emerges in the conservative discourse on (dual) 
citizenship. Discursively this means that ‘terrorism’ is linked to dual citizenship. By 
making this link, an element of ‘threat’ is created. This link is established by headlines, 
such as “terror with two passports” (Müller 2014b) or subheadings like “jihadists are often 
also Germans” (ibid.). Dual citizenship is thereby linked to the “growing local Islamism” 
(ibid.) or the Salafist scene “that is the most dynamic and fastest growing extremist scene” 
(FAZ 2014b). This rapid growth is also linked to the fact that more women are becoming 
part of the scene who long for living “a life pleasing to god, alongside a fighter”. In light 
of this, the withdrawal of the German citizenship from dual citizens among Islamists has 
been discussed and necessary changes in German law proposed, despite the fact that this 
is an extremely sensitive issue due to recent German history (c.f. FAZ 2014b; Müller 
2014b). While the topic of Islamist terrorism appears within the conservative discourse 
on dual citizenship and thereby links (dual) citizenship to an Islamist threat, the discourse 
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nevertheless still centers on the dismantling of the German identity as a result of non-
integration or failed integration of foreigners. 
4.1.2 Legal integration as cornerstone for social integration – liberal discourse 
The claim of the liberal discourse on dual citizenship is that the current Law on 
Citizenship is “outdated” (Cohn-Bendit 1998) and is not “geared to the social reality in 
Germany any longer” (FAZ 1999b). The planned Law on Citizenship is seen as “way 
towards a modern integration policy” (ibid.) and necessary for Germany to “keep pace 
with the times in a globalized world” (ibid.). This holds particularly true since Germany 
– in stark contrast to the conservative discourse’s understanding – is regarded as “a 
country of immigration” (Cohn-Bendit 1998; FAZ 1999b). The liberal discourse pleads 
for a “liberal-minded Europe” (Cohn-Bendit 1998) that does not shut itself off to internal 
and external migration. Dual citizenship and acquisition of citizenship based on the 
territorial principle is viewed as desirable and as having a positive impact on integration. 
Furthermore, dual citizenship is understood as a necessary incentive as the abandonment 
of the former citizenship is oftentimes difficult, expensive and thus, unbearable for the 
naturalization candidates. Therefore the adherents of the liberal discourse demand dual 
citizenship and the abolishment of the jus sanguinis-principle (FAZ 1999b).  
The signature campaign of the CDU is condemned as it “stirs up feelings of resentment” 
(Exner 1999; FAZ 1999e) and “opens up deep emotional ditches” (Exner 1999; c.f. FAZ 
1999f). Some even go so far as to describe the signature campaign as “scorched earth 
policy” (FAZ 1999e) and “spiritual arson” (FAZ 1999f). The campaign is seen as 
“endangering the coexistence of Germans and foreigners” (ibid.).  
The warning, the outcome of inaction, means that either no Law on Citizenship or a too 
limited revision will be passed. Therefore, Exner (1999) makes a plea to “call all the 
parties from the street” (ibid.) and “bring all the parties to the table to facilitate an 
objective discussion” (ibid.) on a new Law on Citizenship. This is in the interest of all 
those, who are really interested in “integration and the promotion of a peaceful 
coexistence” (ibid.). The core argument is that legal integration triggers social integration. 
“Legal integration up to naturalization is a prerequisite for a real social integration. […] 
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Such a solution is particularly urgent for children, who are born in Germany and have 
grown up here” (FAZ 1999b).  
 
The demand, a call for action, is to discontinue the signature campaign of the CDU, to 
stand against racist defamatory statements and against marginalization of any kind. 
Furthermore, it is to find a compromise “which should not be too difficult to reach if 
everyone is showing good will” (Exner 1999) and is “willing to objectivity” (FAZ 1999b). 
Especially important is “to lower the hurdles” (Exner 1999) for naturalizations. Dual 
citizenship for children born to foreign parents in Germany is “according to opinion polls 
capable of achieving a majority”, but not only according to polls. The ‘option model’, a 
proposal of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), is seen as a “workable compromise” (ibid.) 
and a “manageable solution” (ibid.) that can find a majority in Parliament.  
In 2014, the liberal discourse stands up for the abolition of the ‘option model’ that had 
been in place from 2000 onwards. Furthermore, it advocates that also those young 
foreigners who had to opt for one citizenship benefit retrospectively from dual citizenship. 
In particular, Aydan Özuguz, a Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)-politician and 
Commissioner for Immigration, Refugees and Integration from 2013 – 2018, campaigned 
for the retrospective dual citizenship for those children that the ‘option model’ had applied 
to so far. A common argument being that the “difficult decision [to choose between two 
citizenships should] not be imposed on young foreigners” (Banas 2014). The young adults 
who have to opt for one citizenship are referred to as “young foreigners”. This is in spite 
of the fact such individuals do hold both German and a non-EU citizenship until the age 
of 23 de jure, and predominantly opt for the German citizenship (Carstens 2014). This 
indicates that despite their German citizenship they remain looked at as the Other within 
the German membership boundaries. 
The propositional content draws on France as evidence and justification of the liberal 
discourse. In France, it is argued, naturalizations and dual citizenship are not connected 
to “cultural loss due to poorly naturalized fellow countrymen” (Hanimann 1999) but are 
considered to be “an increase in value for the collective (kollektive wertmehrung)” (ibid.). 
In addition, the fear that “inferior Germans with insufficient language capabilities could 
come into being” (ibid.) is unnecessary. When looking at France, “a country that more 
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than any other is careful to ensure the status and purity of its language” (ibid.), the 
opposite is proven true. In 2014, the understanding that integration is a multi-directional 
path and “not a one-way-street” (Banas 2014) gains further prominence. In particular, as 
the chancellor Angela Merkel utilizes this argumentation and states that “immigration is 
an enrichment of our society” (ibid.). Furthermore, this illustrates that a shift of 
proponents of the liberal discourse has taken place. While the majority of the CDU 
opposed the liberal line of argumentation and strongly supported the signature campaign 
in 1999, in 2014 large parts of the CDU back the liberal discourse (Carstens 2014; Müller 
2014a).  
Following Stritzel and Chang’s (2015, 550–551) operationalization of the linguistic and 
grammatical structures of the securitizing speech act illustrates that the liberal discourse 
on dual citizenship does not make a securitizing move with regard to the issue of multiple 
citizenships. There is no account of a threat but rather the setting of an objective that is to 
modernize the current Law of Citizenship by adopting the jus soli-principle and allowing 
for dual citizenship.
The discursive representation of the signature campaign of the CDU within the liberal 
discourse, however, can be seen as an attempt of “counter-securitization” (Stritzel and 
Chang 2015, 551). Stritzel and Chang define counter-securitization as a “linguistically 
regulated process of resistance against crucial elements of the securitization process” 
(ibid., 552). The liberal discourse claims that the signature campaign in identifying a 
threat is threatening the peaceful “coexistence of Germans and foreigners” (FAZ 1999f) 
establishes grudges, and emotionally shakes up German society. However, the warning 
and propositional content are not empirically contextualized regarding this attempt of 
counter-securitization, while the demand is to simply stop the campaign. Therefore, it is 
an unincisive counter-securitization move, that certainly draws on strong metaphors when 
comparing the campaign to “scorched earth policy” (FAZ 1999e) and “spiritual arson” 
(FAZ 1999f) but only appears to a very limited extent in the liberal discourse on dual 
citizenship.  
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4.1.3 The delineation of the Other in the debate of 1998/1999 and 2014 
Within the delineated discourses on (dual) citizenship, and the portrayal of the ‘outgroup’ 
or Other, most people “subliminally […] focus on the Turks” (Exner 1999) when 
speaking of foreigners. In most articles the Other is ‘the Turk’/’the Turkish-Germans’. 
They are the group nearly solely referred to within conservative and liberal discourses. 
There are some other groups that are made reference to, but they play little to no role in 
the debate on (dual) citizenship.  
When talking about the necessary conduct of bilateral negotiations with the countries of 
origin of potential German citizens to prevent disadvantages and repressive measures 
against these “new German foreigners (neue deutsche Auslandsleute)” (Schmitt 1998) 
other groups are mentioned.  “The Iranian teacher, the Kurdish activist, the Lebanese 
doctor, the Serbian member of the Bundestag and the Russian immigrant in police 
uniform holding a German passport” (ibid.) are named. Two things are particularly 
striking regarding these examples. Firstly, they are all still looked at as foreigners with 
German citizenship. Secondly, all of the mentioned groups are associated with respected 
occupations, a clear indicator for being well integrated in society. So, they may be seen 
as the Other within the German membership boundaries. Other groups that appear in the 
debate are “the resettlers” (FAZ 1999d) and “the German-Serbs” (ibid. 1999d) and 
“people from sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and India” (Böckelmann 1998). However, 
all of these groups only pop-up in one or two sentences, a short paragraph at maximum, 
and thereby, do not loom large within the debate on (dual) citizenship. These groups 
remain largely undifferentiated and unspecified and do not play an important role in the 
discourse on dual citizenship. This is also true, for the group of the ‘Russian-Germans’. 
Besides the above-mentioned example, ‘Russian-Germans’ are brought up once more 
along with ‘Iranian-Germans’ and ‘Turkish-Germans’ in a subordinate clause (Carstens 
2014) and in Günther Beckstein’s (back then, Bavarian Minister of the Interior) reference 
to “the resettlers and their children” (FAZ 1999d) as an example of a group that has had 
experienced difficulties of integration, even though all of them had at least German 
citizenship and most of them dual citizenship. In regard to the reference to the ‘resettlers’ 
it is even questionable if Beckstein referred to the group of ‘Russian-Germans’ as most 
of them already fall under the category of ‘late resettlers.’ Since ‘Russian-Germans’ are 
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barely mentioned through-out the entire time of evaluation in 1998/1999 and 2014, the 
keyword search is consequently broadened to include articles on the group of ‘Russian-
Germans’ and ‘late resettlers’ as such without combining it with keywords around the 
topic of dual citizenship.  
4.1.4 ‘Turkish-Germans’ as the Other in the debate of 1998/1999 and 2014 
The Other in the form of ‘Turkish-Germans’ as a group is mostly referred to as “Turks” 
(Böckelmann 1998; Exner 1999), “German-Turks (Deutschtürken)” (Böckelmann 1998) 
or “Germany-Turks (Deutschlandtürken) (Schmitt 1998). While sometimes ‘Turkish-
Germans’ are still implicitly referred to as “guestworkers (Gastarbeiter)” (ibid.), in other 
instances they are already seen as “potential fellow countrymen (potentielle Landsleute)” 
(ibid.). Furthermore, in some texts a difference is made between the first generation of 
Turkish immigrants and the “second and third generation” (Böckelmann 1998; Schmitt 
1998) of Turks, “the Turkish youth” (Böckelmann 1998; Schmitt 1998), in Germany.  
Whenever the ‘second and third generation’/‘the Turkish youth’ is explicitly mentioned, 
it is done so in a negative manner. The ‘second and third generation’ is characterized as 
“frustrated” (Schmitt 1998) and badly integrated. The poor integration is characterized by 
a strong tendency to watch Turkish television programs, by insufficient language skills, 
and by a propensity to violence. They are said to have neither mastered German nor 
Turkish. The only language they supposedly know is “the language of violence” (ibid.). 
This inclination to violence is underlined by the link between ‘the Turkish youth’ and 
“youth gangs” (Böckelmann 1998) and by the reference to the above-mentioned case of 
“Mehmet” (Schmitt 1998). This poor and unsuccessful integration is further emphasized 
by their tendency to “retreat into religious and national outsiderism” (Böckelmann 1998) 
and “self-ghettoization” (ibid.). Only the formulation that ‘the Turkish youth’ is “driven 
into a siding/into social seclusion (auf das soziale Abstellgleis gestellt warden)” (ibid.) 
hints at the possibility that the outsiderism and self-ghettoization might after all not be as 
self-induced as most of the articles lead the reader to believe. What differentiates the 
characterization of the ‘second and third generation’ from the first generation is their 
inclination to violence.   
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The group of ‘Turkish-Germans’ as such is characterized as “religious” (Schmitt 1998, 
Adam 1999, Böckelmann 1998), “badly integrated” (Schmitt 1998) and “low income 
earners or nonworkers” (ibid.).  
The religiosity is established in the discourse through the use of attributes. Thus, a Turkish 
woman is referred to as “chubby woman with a headscarf” (Schmitt 1998), and Turkish 
men a characterized by their clicking prayer chains (ibid.). The “chubby woman with 
headscarf” is not referred to by her name or further described. By only characterizing her 
by the shape of her body and the wearing of a headscarf the author implicitly takes up a 
discussion – the headscarf debate – that has been conducted in Germany since 1998. 
Within this debate one big thread of discussion sees the headscarf as emblematic for the 
subordination of women to men and the affiliation to a fundamentalist religious 
orientation. The headscarf is a symbol for Islam and its backwardness. The tacit reference 
to this thread of discussion is reinforced by the fact that the woman is indirectly quoted 
posing a question that concerns her husband and not herself (ibid.). Islam is seen as 
‘hopelessly backward’ (Böckelmann 1998) and equated with fundamentalism, 
patriarchalism and paternalism (ibid. 1998). To be specific Böckelmann (1998) makes 
the equation that, “Islam minus fundamentalism minus patriarchalism minus paternalism 
minus the absolute claim for truth minus daily life- and political ethics equals to a liberal, 
democratic Islam” (ibid.). That this is the prevailing understanding of Islam and 
simultaneously seen as conflicting with the German value system is emphasized by 
problematizing Islamic religious instruction in German schools as one of the core reasons 
for unsuccessful integration of foreigners (Adam 1999). Furthermore, the mosque-goers 
are seen as antonym of well-integrated foreigners and as living in their own subculture 
(ibid.). The ‘Turkish-Germans’ are linked to the backward and religious Islam that is 
implicitly differentiated against a modern and liberal-minded ‘German’ that holds high 
the values of enlightenment, equality, and self-responsibility. Thus, the discourse on 
(dual) citizenship resonates with existing discourses that employ the common trope of 
‘sociocultural backwardness' of people of Muslim origin and also with their reluctance to 
integrate, as the next section makes clear.  
The poor integration of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ is first and foremost illustrated in this 
discourse by insufficient knowledge of the German language. In an article that describes 
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a meeting between a district mayor of Berlin and the same district’s commissioner for 
aliens with potential Turkish naturalization candidates, it is repeatedly stated that this 
meeting would be “unthinkable without an interpreter” (Schmitt 1998) which points 
towards basic German language skills at best. Also, the above-mentioned fact that the 
‘Turkish Youth’ is characterized as having mastered neither German nor Turkish 
underlines this (ibid.). Furthermore, it hints at limited language skills on the side of their 
parents and indicates that the parents have not encouraged their children to master the 
German language. Moreover, ‘Turkish-Germans’ are linked to “bad transnationality” 
(Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 191) which is seen as facilitating the disintegration of 
immigrants (ibid., 191). “Turkish satellite channels” (Böckelmann 1998, c.f. Adam 
1999), “the Anatolian greengrocer’s shop” (Adam 1999) and “the mosque nearby” (ibid.) 
are used as metaphors for living in “parallel societies” (FAZ 1999a). It is seen as 
emblematic for the ‘Turkish-Germans’’ strong tendency to live in their own communities 
according to their own laws, their life in a subculture. Exemplary for this are 
confrontations of ‘Turkish-Germans’ with the Kurdish minority in Germany and the 
objectives of Islamic fundamentalist that are incompatible with Germany’s democratic 
basic order of the Basic Law (Exner1999). Furthermore, the non-application for 
naturalization on the part of those Turkish citizens that fulfil the German naturalization 
criteria is understood as decision against Germany and against holding the German 
citizenship exclusively (Böckelmann 1998). Even more so, as Turkey “has built a golden 
bridge” for those Turks in the form of the so-called “pink passports”19 (ibid.). 
Simultaneously, the duty of loyalty of ‘Turkish-Germans’ is questioned as influenceable 
by Turkish politics and politicians instancing the election recommendation of the Turkish 
prime minister in the federal elections of 1998 (Böckelmann 1998). This topic gains 
prominence in the evaluation period of 2014, where Turkey is increasingly portrayed as 
“having one foot in Germany through its citizens” (Müller 2014a) and of perceiving of 
‘Turkish-Germans’ as its own compatriots (ibid. 2014a). Often cited in relation to this 
topic is the Turkish President’s statement made in Cologne in 2008, where he said that 
                                                          
19 The pink passport, actually named pink card (nowadays: blue card), can be applied for by former Turkish 
citizens that have renounced their Turkish citizenship. As holder of the pink card they enjoy extensive 
statutory benefits, inter alia the right to work and to take possession of their inheritance (Kraler 2006, 58). 
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“assimilation is a crime against humanity” (Bannas 2014, Müller 2014a). Turkey is seen 
to make efforts to permanently nurture its emigres and the emigres are portrayed as still 
feeling committed to Turkey (Kielmansegg 2014). The fear is expressed that “a 
permanently only semi-integrated compact ethnic minority with all conceivable political 
implications” (ibid.) will be part of the German societal reality. Hence, the discourse on 
(dual) citizenship links the ‘Turkish-Germans’ to being poorly-integrated via depictions 
of insufficient language skills, bad transnationality, a gateway for Turkey to influence 
Germany, and a deliberate decision against the German citizenship. 
Closely linked to the topic of integration is their portrayal in relation to the labor market. 
‘Turkish-Germans’ are depicted as part of the socially deprived, poor, and poorly-trained 
group of immigrants. Kreuzberg, a district in Berlin heavily populated with ‘Turkish-
Germans’, is emblematic for this. The description of the district, that makes up a large 
part of one of the articles, characterizes it as a poor neighborhood and disadvantaged 
urban area. Moreover, it is said that the unemployment rate among foreigners in this 
district is at about 37 percent, a fact that cannot be concealed by handing out German 
passports to non-German unemployed (Schmitt 1998). Foreigners with a Turkish passport 
are the biggest group of foreigners receiving unemployment benefits, followed by Iraqis 
and Russians. While the figures show that the numbers of Turkish claimants of 
unemployment benefits has been decreasing for some years up until 2013, this is directly 
assumed to be linked to increasing numbers of former Turkish citizens holding either the 
German or dual citizenship. Consequently, they no longer can be counted as foreigners 
in the statistics (FAZ 2014a). Furthermore, the ‘Turkish-Germans’ are characterized as 
indifferent and ignorant towards the German unemployment benefit system. It is depicted 
as very difficult to explain “why unemployment benefits are accepted as evidence of one’s 
own maintenance, while unemployment assistance and social benefits are not”. The 
evidence of one’s own maintenance is necessary to apply for naturalization. However, the 
explanation seems to generate insufficient interest on part of the group of Turks anyhow 
(Schmitt 1998). This contributes to a picture, that associates ‘Turkish-Germans’ as 
uninterested, uninformed and passive since they are being portrayed as not having put 
any effort into obtaining information beforehand. Thereby, ‘Turkish-Germans’ are linked 
to low income earners or nonworkers, and to being uninterested, uninformed and passive.  
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As illustrated in the preceding paragraphs, ‘Turkish-Germans’ are defined through a 
positive process of linking backward, religious, poorly-integrated, low-skilled and low-
paid workers or non-workers. This positive process of linking is implicitly opposed to the 
self-definition of ‘Germans’. While not directly mentioned in the articles, being German 
is associated with “tolerance, democracy, and enlightenment” (Foroutan 2013, 9) with 
being “hard-working, proper, and punctual” (ibid.). Thereby, the positive identity of 
‘Turkish-Germans’ is juxtaposed to an idea of ‘Germaness’, through a series of linkes 
defined by a negative process of differentiating. The presented image of the ‘Turkish-
Germans’ fully reflects the tropes of people of Muslim origin as ‘sociocultural backward’ 
and ‘unwilling to integrate’ (c.f. Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 198–204).  
4.1.5 ‘Turkish-Germans’ as the Other in the evaluation period of 2017 
In 2017, the ‘Turkish-Germans’ are most commonly referred to as “German-Turkish 
community (deutschtürkische Community)” (Krüger 2017), “people of Turkish 
background (türkeistämmig)” (FAZ.NET 2017, Krüger 2017), “German-Turks 
(Deutschtürken / Deutsch-Türken)” (FAZ.NET 2017, Mülller 2017) and “Germans with 
Turkish roots (Deutsche mit türkischen Wurzeln)” (Müller 2017). “Turks”, the form of 
naming that clearly prevailed in the newspaper articles of the evaluation periods 1998 – 
1999 and 2014, is being replaced by the now prevailing forms of “German-Turks” and 
“people of Turkish background”. Whenever, the term ‘Turks’ pops up it, it is used to talk 
about those people living in Germany that exclusively hold the Turkish passport.  
This change of naming conventions reflects an emerging and growing trend of using 
“hyphenation as a way of emphasising one’s multiple cultural belongings” (Baban 2006, 
189). Unlike in US-American and Canadian discursive traditions, the practice of 
hyphenation has been rare in German discourse. However, the term “German-Turk” could 
conceivably amplify “the hegemonic view in Germany that they are Turks as the emphasis 
is on the Turkishness” (Baban 2006, 189). The term ‘Turkish-German’ is, therefore, 
preferable as it reflects a political stance and “dislocates the homogeneous representation 
of German national identity by indicating that there exist Germans with Turkish origin” 
(ibid., 189). This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that ‘Russian-Germans’ are 
in the vast majority of cases referred to as ‘Russian-Germans’, the emphasis being on 
their ‘Germanness’ not on their ‘Russianness’ (c.f. chapter 4.1.6). Whereas, the naming 
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of ‘German-Turks’ not only prevails, but the term ‘Turkish-Germans’ is employed only 
once throughout all articles (Böckelmann 1998). In this particular article the term 
‘Turkish-Germans’ is employed rather as a warning of what could happen if “German-
Turks will have two passports and are thus also Turkish-Germans” (ibid.). Hence, it seems 
that the existence of Germans with Russian migration history is accepted in German 
discursive traditions, while the stress still lies on the Turkishness of ‘Turkish-Germans’. 
Nevertheless, the prevailing use of ‘German-Turks’ and of ‘people of Turkish origin’ still 
underlines that there are people of multiple cultural belongings among the German 
citizenry.  
The positive process of linking the ‘Turkish-Germans’ to the backward, religious, poorly-
integrated, low-skilled and low-paid workers or non-workers is supported by the 
evaluation period of 2017. It once more highlights the strong tendency of using “native-
language media […] especially among older people and young people with a low 
educational attainment level” (Krüger 2017). Furthermore, it stresses that in general the 
group of ‘Turkish-Germans’ “come from families who came in the 1960s as guest 
workers from Anatolia to Europe” (ibid.) and originate from “educationally deprived, 
conservative-religious strata” (ibid.). The voting behavior of the ‘Turkish-German’ 
citizens regarding the constitutional referendum held on 16th of April 2017, is seen to 
prove “the failed integration of the German-Turkish community” (ibid.) across the 
political spectrum. The majority of people that were eligible to vote, voted for the 
constitutional changes that granted more power to president Erdoğan. As a consequence 
of the results, German politicians requested that ‘Turkish-Germans’ fully “commit 
themselves to their new homeland” (FAZ.NET 2017) and participate in a “dialog about a 
constructive shared future” (ibid.). A “further drifting apart of the German and Turkish 
cultural worlds” (ibid.) needs to be averted. Furthermore, it is unacceptable that some 
‘Turkish-Germans’ seem to “believe that it is enough, to stand on the German basic law 
on tiptoes only” (ibid.). The CDU/Christian Social Union (CSU) calls into question the 
decision on granting dual citizenship for children of foreign parents born in Germany. 
They demand stricter regulations, including the abolition of the provisions granting the 
right to dual citizenship. Stephan Mayer a member of the CSU was quoted as saying, “I 
believe it is important that in the next legislative period we reverse the facilitations of 
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dual citizenship” (ibid.). The basic idea underlying this line of argument is that one has 
“to decide: for a liberal country or against” (Müller 2017); for a European country where 
democracy and freedom of speech exist or “for a system minimizing freedom” (ibid.; c.f. 
Kehler 2017). The liberal regime generously granting and tolerating dual citizenship is 
perceived as especially “disastrous” (Müller 2017) if within the country of the second 
citizenship there is a regime that “never releases its (former) citizens and that always 
perceives them to be a metric for political maneuver (politische Manövriermasse)” (ibid.). 
This argument, despite its universal character, directly refers to the group of ‘Turkish-
Germans’ as the author before and afterwards talks about the ‘Turkish-Germans’ and the 
headline of the article is “the choice of the Turks” (ibid.). While the generalization and 
presentation of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ as a collective entity prevails, and the process of 
linking ‘Turkish-Germans’ to the poorly integrated prevails, contrary views are voiced 
on a small scale.  
The ‘Hayir’20-campaign serves as a positive example. It exemplifies that the group of the 
‘Turkish-Germans’ is not monolithic. Turgut Yüksel, a dual citizen, is quoted that “who 
has grown up and went to school here, he or she can surely not uncritically accept what 
Erdoğan has said” (Kehler 2017). Furthermore, he states that with their Facebook-
campaign they would like to “encourage those, that would like to vote against” (ibid.) the 
constitutional changes. He further points out that “if someone will encounter irreversible 
damage, then those people, who despite their Turkish citizenship take a critical look at 
the situation” (ibid.).  
Furthermore, the prevailing opinion that the voting behavior of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ in 
the referendum is emblematic for their poor-/non-integration is questioned. To use “the 
voting behavior as yardstick for integration […] is only plausible at first glance. To zero 
in on the question of dual citizenship is adventurous” (Krüger 2017). Various 
circumstances are listed that could potentially explain the voting behavior of the ‘Turkish-
Germans’, inter alia cross-generational positioning and the enforced conformity of 
Turkish media (ibid.). In the evaluation period of 2017, the monolithic construction of the 
                                                          
20 Hayir = Turkish for no. The campaign that was triggered by two members of the Hessian Parliament, 
Turgut Yüksel and Mürvet Öztürk, pools protest actions in Hesse that stand against the referendum (Kehler 
2017). 
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‘Turkish-Germans’ as poorly-integrated is scrutinized for the first time. This is closely 
linked to the fact, that it is also the first time that explicit references to individuals – 
Turgut Yüksel and Mürvet Öztürk – as positive examples are made and individuals of 
Turkish origin or with Turkish and German citizenship are directly quoted in a very 
personal, specific, and positive manner. The collective entity of the ‘Turkish-German’ is 
dismantled, but only to a very limited degree. Largely, the characterization of the 
‘Turkish-Germans’ as poorly integrated still prevails, thereby supporting the above-
delineated positive process of linking the ‘Turkish-Germans’ to the backward, religious, 
poorly-integrated, low-skilled and low-paid workers or non-workers. 
4.1.6 ‘Russian-Germans’ as the Other in the evaluation period of 2016 
The group of ‘Russian-Germans’ is referred to as “Russia-Germans (Russlanddeutsche)” 
(Budras 2016; Clemm 2016; Klimeniouk 2016; Soldt 2016), “(late) resettlers 
(Spätaussiedler)” (Clemm 2016; Soldt 2016) “Ethnic Germans from the former Eastern 
bloc (ethnisch Deutsche aus den ehemaligen Ostblockstaaten)” (Clemm 2016), as “group 
of immigrants (Gruppe von Einwanderern)” who immigrated either from Kazakhstan or 
Russia, or as part of the “Russian-speaking community (russischsprachige Community)” 
(Klimeniouk 2016). “The Russian-speaking community” is further subdivided into ethnic 
Germans, people of Jewish origin from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
children born in Germany, reunited family members, migrant workers and spouses of 
Germans (ibid). It is striking that in stark contrast to the ‘Turkish-speaking community’, 
a differentiation is made between different Russian-speaking groups. This distinction is 
underlined by the fact that some news articles deliberately differentiate between ‘Russian-
Germans’ and ‘German-Russians’. In one article Heinrich Groth is referred to as 
‘Russian-German’, while Alexej Danckwardt is introduced to the reader as ‘German-
Russian’. Thereby, the article indicates that Heinrich Groth is of ethnic German origin, 
while Alexej Danckwardt is an ethnic Russian who moved to Germany (Wehner 2016). 
However, in some of the other articles the use of the terms ‘Russian-Germans’ and 
‘German-Russians’ seems to be rather random. Having said this, the use of the term 
‘Russian-Germans’ clearly prevails in all articles. No differentiation is made between 
different generations of ‘Russian-Germans’, the ‘Russian-speaking community,’ or 
‘German-Russians’. However, the majority of the group immigrated to Germany in the 
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1990s and has thus been in Germany for a comparatively short period of time, especially 
when contrasting it to the group of ‘Turkish-Germans’ that has been living in Germany 
since the 1960s.  
The ‘Russian-Germans’ are characterized as “well-integrated” into German society. After 
some initial difficulties on the side of the ‘Russian-Germans’ as well as on the side of the 
long-established Germans, they are said to have really arrived in Germany and to have 
fully integrated into society (Soldt 2016). This is emphasized by the very concrete, 
personal, and named representation of the ‘Russian-Germans’. Through means of direct 
reporting many ‘Russian-German’ individuals are introduced to the reader in a personal 
manner. Some of them are even portrayed as “shining examples of successful integration” 
(Budras 2016). What all of these ‘shining examples’ have in common is their fluent 
command of German. So that even the “nostalgic singsong of their Russian dialect” (ibid.) 
or “the soft trilling R-sound” (Clemm 2016) are portrayed as charming rather than 
disturbing. For some, it is even said that there is nothing left to signal their migrant 
background (Budras 2016). They are characterized as having kept “a part of their Russian 
identity” (Soldt 2016). Indicators of this Russian identity are the Russian-style food they 
eat, the holidays they celebrate, Russian hospitality, folklore and political discussions 
(Soldt 2016; Budras 2016). However, they are said to basically “have no cultural 
peculiarities or at least no irritating ones” (Budras 2016). By naming the infamous 
German pop singer Helene Fischer one could even argue that they are seen as having 
become part of German contemporary culture (ibid.). Regarding the integration of 
‘Russian-Germans’ the collocation of “silent integration (geräuschlose Integration)” 
(Budras 2016; Clemm 2016) is employed quite frequently. This silent and soundless 
integration is further sustained by the fact that the long-established Germans when asked 
whether the ‘Russian-Germans’ have integrated themselves smoothly, either agree or 
“have heard nothing of the influx of the late resettlers” (Clemm 2016).  
While ‘Turkish-Germans’ are linked to bad transnationality, ‘Russian-Germans’ are 
mostly linked to good transnationality; the ‘Turkish-Germans’ negatively connoted 
“Anatolian greengrocer’s shop” turns into the “Russian convenience store” (Soldt 2016; 
Clemm 2016) that is the central meeting place of the ‘Russian-Germans’ and the center 
of Russian life. These ‘Russian convenience stores’ are characterized as “well sorted” 
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(Soldt 2016), as having “the best fish supply” in town (ibid.) and as “offering everything 
the Russian heart desires” (Clemm 2016). Only in one instance the ‘Russian convenience 
store’ is used as symbol for a dubious political attitude on the side of the ‘Russian-
speaking community’ as you cannot only find “cabbage and cheesy detective stories, but 
also t-shirts with the portrait of Stalin or Putin as well as conspiracist writings” 
(Klimeniouk 2016). However, the “Russian convenience store” is positively connoted in 
the majority of cases. A further point underlining the good transnationality of ‘Russian-
Germans’ is closely connected to their integration into the German labor market which is 
described in the next paragraph. The discourse links the ‘Russian-Germans’ to the well-
integrated in the form of very good language skills and good transnationality.  
The integration of the ‘Russian-Germans’ into the German labor market is seen as a “true 
success story” (Budras 2016) quoting indirectly the research report of the Federal Office 
for Migration and Refugees for 2013. The employment rate is unusually high and the 
unemployment rate of about 7.2 percent is relatively low in comparison to other 
immigrant groups where about 10 percent are unemployed. When looking at the ‘Russian-
German’ individuals that are quoted either directly or indirectly in the articles, (Budras 
2016; Clemm 2016; Klimeniouk 2016; Soldt 2016; Wehner 2016) they are 
mathematicians, engineers, politicians, lawyers, historians and social anthropologists.  
People, therefore, who have either successfully gotten their educational and professional 
certificates recognized or have attained their university entrance qualifications in 
Germany (Budras 2016; Clemm 2016; Wehner 2016). Even those, who did not get their 
certificates recognized, were doing work for which they were overqualified “without a 
murmur” (Budras 2016). Furthermore, ‘Russian-Germans’ have turned into business 
founders, they have started “businesses, opened doctor’s practices, built car repair shops 
or hotels, in which artificial leather beds from Russian manufacturers stand in the classical 
black forest room” (Soldt 2016). Particularly in regard to their own businesses and hotels, 
the skill of speaking two or more languages fluently is seen as a big advantage and as an 
instance of good transnationality. An example for this is the transport company of Olesja 
and Eduard Rudi. “First, they only sold construction machinery to Kazakhstan, then they 
acquired articulated lorries for an own transport company. […] The company is 
expanding” (ibid.). Captions in the company are in “German, English and Russian” 
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(ibid.). Olesja Rudi is, moreover, the leader of the association of Russian-German 
businessmen and “studied in the United States” (ibid.). Furthermore, the Rudis nowadays 
“support […] the local soccer club financially and pay a contribution towards the costs of 
the gym for their employees” (ibid.). Moreover, not only the academics and business 
founders are very well regarded but also the non-academic ‘Russian-Germans’. They are 
characterized as “diligent, manually skillful workers” (Soldt 2016) and said to have been 
warmly welcomed by companies in need of capable workers.  
However, problems of integration into the labor market are also mentioned. The district 
Marzahn-Hellersdorf in Berlin is referred to as “cipher of problems of integration” 
(Clemm 2016) among the ‘Russian-Germans’. Here the unemployment rate of ‘Russian-
Germans’ is at a high of about 21 percent of the 30.000 ‘Russian-Germans’ living there. 
Having said this, the large number of ‘Russian-Germans’ living in this district are not 
associated with self-ghettoization or of living in their own subculture. Rather the question 
is raised “if the spatial concentration of immigrants is a problem at all” (Clemm 2016). 
Regarding the group of ‘Russian-Germans’ two opposing mechanisms are said to be at 
play; “on the one hand strong segregation would reduce contact to the local population. 
[…] On the other hand, networking by a close connection to the own ethnic group could 
facilitate to gain a foothold in everyday life and profession” (ibid.)
The district of Kreuzberg that is referred to as symbol of the poor integration of the 
‘German-Turkish’ community into the labor market and characterized by high numbers 
of unemployment among the group of ‘Turkish-Germans’ is portrayed as emblematic for 
the failure of multiculturalism (Schmitt 1998). Marzahn-Hellersdorf which is for 
‘Russian-Germans’ what Kreuzberg is for the ‘Turkish-Germans’ a symbol for high 
unemployment rates among the respective community is presented in a much more 
neutral manner. Facts and figures are stated but no devastating conclusion with respect to 
the overall integration of the group of ‘Russian-Germans’ nor multiculturalism as such 
are drawn. While thereby the integration of ‘Russian-Germans’ into the labor market and 
consequently into society is questioned, by and large the group is linked to being well-
integrated into the local labor market, as well as well-trained and highly qualified. This 
is underlined by the fact that if a ‘Russian-German’ “catches one’s eyes, then it is one of 
the few who have not-yet-arrived, as they for instance drink alcohol in broad daylight” 
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(Klimeniouk 2016). Additionally, throughout all articles the ‘Russian-Germans’ are 
referred to as “homeowners” (Budras 2016; Soldt 2016). In Germany, a country where 
the majority of people are not living in their own home but in rented accommodation and 
homeowners are implicitly associated with higher strata of society, this underlines the 
characterization of ‘Russian-Germans’ as well-integrated into the labor market and 
characterizes them as better of immigrant group.  
The religiosity of the ‘Russian-Germans’ is only mentioned once as they are said to 
having sought “their fulfillment […] in family, in church and in building houses” (Soldt 
2016). Seeking their fulfillment in church suggests that they are regular church-goers. 
The statement is made in a very neutral manner and therefore hints at the fact that the 
‘Russian-Germans’’ religiosity is not perceived in a negative manner, however, at the 
same time it does not seem to play an important role in German discourse as it is 
mentioned only in one of the articles.  
The merely positive representation of the ‘Russian-Germans’ is called into question by 
the happenings around the case of ‘Lisa’. The main focus lies on the political orientation 
of the ‘Russian-Germans’. The ‘Russian-Germans’ are at large represented as being rather 
“conservative” (Soldt 2016). Furthermore, they are said to “appreciate authorities” (ibid.) 
and their political argumentation is seen as oftentimes being in line with the arguments 
of the Russian official and media discourse (ibid.). However, they had been perceived as 
politically inactive and uninterested in politics (Wehner 2016). While the CDU had been 
seen as “natural sink” (Budras 2016) for the ‘Russian-Germans’ for a long time, a 
“separation process from the established political parties” (ibid.) has been taking place 
recently culminating in the demonstrations in January 2016 as response to the case of 
‘Lisa’. The trigger for this on-going separation process of many (Budras 2016) is said to 
be the so-called ‘refugee crisis’.  
The ‘Russian-Germans’ have lately oriented themselves towards the right-wing populist 
party, the AfD, with right-extreme tendencies. The AfD and ‘Russian-Germans’ are said 
to be bounded by a “cordial and deep friendship” (ibid.). The ‘Russian-Germans’ are 
characterized as “a large group of immigrants with whom the AfD gets on pefectly”. This 
is underlined by statements put forward by Aleksander Lejbo, the founder of the network 
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of Russian-Germans in the AfD of Rhineland-Palatinate, a ‘Russian-German’ himself. 
According to Lejbo, the ‘Russian-Germans’’ and the AfD’s worldview and principles 
“are 100 percent consistent” (ibid.). Furthermore, ‘Russian-Germans’ also do not believe 
in the concept of multiculturalism, “we do not believe in multiculti” (ibid.), as they have 
had experience with living in a multi-ethnic state. Therefore, they “feel the peculiarities 
intimately” (ibid.). During the demonstrations that took place as response to the alleged 
rape of the ‘Russian-German’ girl Lisa, ‘Russian-Germans’ were repeatedly reported to 
voice xenophobic slogans, to trivialize Nazi Germany and to disparage Germany’s 
leading politicians. One man is quoted that he “is tired of hearing about the Nazi-Crap” 
(Wehner 2016), he continues that “it is unacceptable that we as Germans should be 
ashamed” (ibid.). An old lady is quoted as posing the question “What Merkel has done in 
the past ten years?” (ibid.), the response given by the lady herself is that Merkel “has 
killed more people than Hitler did” (ibid.). Their behavior is, however, partly excused as 
they are “no real troublemakers” (Soldt 2016) while the demonstrations “did not fit at all 
to the behavioral patterns” (ibid.) of ‘Russian-Germans’. Furthermore, an explanation for 
this deviant behavior is found. ‘Russian-Germans’ have been made “jittery” (ibid.) and 
“switched into alarm mode (auf Alarm schalten)” (ibid.) by the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. 
The empathy the refugees experienced when welcomed with banners and under applause 
simply was a great deal too much for the ‘Russian-Germans’ “who had to work hard for 
their position in German society” (Budras 2016). They believe that their position, their 
“nest-building” (Soldt 2016), in society is endangered. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
‘Russian-Germans’ clearly delineate themselves from the newcomers. Not only do they 
emphasize that they themselves cannot be equated to the asylum seekers, but they point 
out that they “are Germans” (ibid.). And with reference to the sexual assaults on New 
Year’s Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne, they point out that they “have usually great respect for 
women” (ibid.). In their point of view the “wrong people are coming to Germany now” 
(ibid.) indicating that they were the right people to come. This self-perception is 
reinforced by Peter Weiß, a Parliamentarian of the Bundestag, who underlines the 
different legal status of ‘Russian-Germans’ and asylum seekers and highlights "the 
fundamentally different legal status” (ibid.) of the two groups. There is no need for “a 
new integration program [since] the late resettlers arrived a long time ago” (ibid.) 
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However, it is important to engage in a constructive dialogue focusing on the accuracy of 
media coverage so that they let themselves not be goaded by Russian media reporting. 
Also, their support for the AfD is put into perspective as it is really difficult to estimate 
how many ‘Russian-Germans’ do indeed support the AfD since they cannot be singled 
out by the sound of their names or by their nationality. “Also, the polling institute Forsa 
that has already thoroughly analyzed the AfD-electorate, can only wave away on the 
question of exact numbers” (Budras 2016). It is also pointed out that many ‘Russian 
Germans’, inter alia the Association of Russian-Germans, have distanced themselves 
from the demonstrations and statements made during these demonstrations.” They do not 
want to damage the good relationship” (Soldt 2016) of ‘Germans’ and ‘Russian-
Germans’. Guilt for the demonstrations is mainly allocated to the Russian media coverage 
and Russian officials, due to the “crude claim of the Russian state media” (ibid.) as they 
seek “to utilize this mood” (Wehner 2016) and the insecurity of the ‘Russian-Germans’. 
Only in one article is the argument that the ‘Russian-Germans’ as a “prime example for 
successful integration” (Klimeniouk 2016) truly called into question. This article 
describes the group as “extremely servile to Moscow” (ibid.) and as “prone to xenophobic 
slogans and to anti-European propaganda” (ibid.). The Russian media coverage that is 
part of Russia’s hybrid warfare is, consequently, said to build on pre-existing attitudes 
among the group (ibid.). The positive process of linking the ‘Russian-Germans’ to the 
well-integrated is severely questioned. However, while one article clearly speaks out 
against the characterization of ‘Russian-Germans’ as well-integrated, the others still link 
them to the well-integrated. However, it is acknowledged that many do hold questionable 
political opinions and political beliefs that diverge from the German majority’s beliefs 
(Soldt 2016).
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Figure 2. Processes of linking: positive identity  
 
As illustrated in the preceding paragraphs, ‘Russian-Germans’ are defined through a 
positive process of linking the religious (neutral), well-integrated, highly-qualified and 
well-paid (c.f. figure 2). ‘Turkish-Germans’, in stark contrast, are defined through a 
positive process of linking backward, religious (negatively connoted), poorly-integrated, 
low-skilled and low-paid workers or non-workers (c.f. figure 2). This series of links is at 
the same time juxtaposed against an implicit ‘German’ series of links through a negative 
process of differentiation. While not directly mentioned in the articles, being German is 
associated with “tolerance, democracy, and enlightenment” (Foroutan 2013, 9) and with 
being “hard-working, proper, and punctual” (ibid.). The presented image of the ‘Turkish-
Germans’ fully reflects the common tropes of people of Muslim origin as ‘sociocultural 
backward’ and ‘unwilling to integrate’ (c.f. Faist and Ulbricht 2015, 198–204). In stark 
contrast to ‘Turkish-Germans’, ‘Russian-Germans’ are depicted through a positive 
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process of linking well-integrated, well-educated/well-trained, well-paid and religious 
(no connotation). Moreover, ‘Russian-Germans’ are linked to ‘good transnationality’. 
The two cases illustrate that different ‘degrees of Otherness’ prevail. Whereas the 
‘Russian-Germans’ are merely presented as slightly “different” (Diez 2005, 628), the 
‘Turkish-Germans’ are presented as “inferior” (ibid., 628). The ‘inferior Turkish-
Germans’ are described as “undermining the standards of the self” (ibid., 628) through 
their lack of integrating themselves into German society. The group of ‘Turkish-
Germans’ serves as the key reference point within the conservative discourse on dual 
citizenship. ‘Turkish-Germans’ are the Other in this discourse. The degradation of 
national identity that is conjured up by the conservative discourse on dual nationality 
directly links the non-integration or failed integration of foreigners to the ‘Turkish-
Germans’ as a paradigm of bad integration. Thus, ‘Turkish-Germans’ are turned into the 
referent subject in the conservative discourse’s process of securitization that seeks to 
establish German identity as referent object and thereby, as existentially threatened. 
Looking at Roe’s (2008) two-stage process of securitization only the first stage – the stage 
of rhetorical securitization – is met. The CDU-signature campaign serves as an example 
of audience support for the conservative discourse’s securitization move. However, as jus 
soli-elements were introduced in 2000 and further strengthened in 2014, one cannot speak 
of having reached the second stage – the stage of active securitization – where actual 
emergency measures are being implemented. After analyzing the discursive securitization 
of dual citizenship, the next section focuses on the securitization of routines. 
4.2. Analysis II – Management of Unease 
After analyzing discursive securitization of (dual) citizenship, this part of the analysis 
centers on Bigo’s approach to securitization following a logic of routine, in this case 
securitization through a specific set of practices, that is naturalization practices/practices 
of awarding dual citizenship with naturalization. Green (2010, 174) identifies two stages 
of evolving citizenship policies in Europe. In the first phase during the 1990s, European 
countries liberalized their citizenship regimes as a response to changed realities as 
European countries had turned into countries of immigration. Access to citizenship for 
foreigners was facilitated. In the second phase starting around the year of 2001, access of 
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citizenship was restricted, as the logic changed “towards a thickening of citizenship, with 
many countries successively introducing assimilatory elements such as language and 
citizenship tests, integration courses and citizenship ceremonies” (ibid., 174). This 
thickening of citizenship is what Orgad refers to as cultural turn across European 
citizenship regimes. 
These two distinct phases are clearly visible regarding changes in the naturalization 
conditions in Germany’s Nationality Law (Green 2010). In 1999, changes to the German 
Law on Citizenship were passed reducing the residence period necessary for legal 
entitlement to naturalization from fifteen to eight years, thereby halving the required 
residence period and significantly liberalizing naturalization conditions (BMI 2018; 
Goodman 2012, 680–681; Green 2010, 175; Hailbronner and Farahat 2015, 7). However, 
the 2004 and 2007 reform of the German Law on Citizenship introduced significant 
assimilatory elements (BMI 2018; Green 2010, 174) amounting to a cultural turn in 
Germany’s naturalization regime. These changes are described in the following 
paragraphs drawing on the above-mentioned mechanisms of cultural integration 
requirements/cultural defense policies that are utilized for the management of unease 
concerning the naturalization process: (1) citizenship tests, (2) language requirements, (3) 
loyalty oaths, (4) attachment requirements, and (5) integration contracts (Orgad 2015, 86; 
Orgad 2017, 351). 
Citizenship tests are one of the five categories of cultural defense policies that seek to 
control for a high cultural integration of naturalization candidates by testing the general 
knowledge and cultural assimilation of naturalization applicants. They thereofre function 
as a gatekeeper securing the inclusion of ‘desired’ foreigners, who have achieved a certain 
standard of cultural and knowledge-based integration and the exclusion of the 
‘undesired’. In Germany, the federal citizenship test was implemented in September 2008 
(BMI 2018). The federal test is a knowledge-based written test. Out of 330 potential 
questions, 33 questions are asked per test and 17 or more have to be answered correctly 
by the naturalization candidate (Heilbronner and Farahat 2015, 12). The questions are 
multiple choice in character and questions are focused on “history, geography, 
constitutional principles, national symbols and German customs” (Orgad 2010, 68). 
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Naturalization candidates with a German high school degree are exempted (Heilbronner 
and Farahat 2015, 12). The harmonized federal citizenship test was introduced as a 
consequence of a fierce debate over integration tests implemented on the federal state 
level by Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hesse in 2005/2006 (Etzioni 2007, 356; Hailbronner 
and Farahat 2015, 11). The citizenship tests in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hesse were 
more character-based and aimed at naturalization candidates of Muslim faith. This fact 
was evident concerning the test in Baden-Wuerttemberg where the test was utilized only 
in the naturalization process of immigrants from the member states of the Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation. Even though in Hesse, the test was administered to all 
naturalization candidates, the content made clear that it was also targeted towards 
naturalization candidates of Muslim faith (Etzioni 2007, 356; Orgad 2010, 67–68). Both 
tests focused on questions of gender equality, religion, marital relations, parenting, 
promiscuity, ethics, politics and culture and were very intrusive in character (Orgad 2010, 
67–68). Possible questions were inter alia “Is it right that women obey their husbands and 
for men to beat their wives?” (Etzioni 2007, 356), “If your daughter dressed like a 
German, would you try to prevent her from doing so?” (ibid., 356) or “If someone 
described the Holocaust as a myth or folktale, how would you respond?” (ibid., 356). By 
(in-)directly testing people of Muslim origin, the citizenships test used in Baden-
Wuerttemberg and Hesse reflect the above-discussed process of linking the ‘Turkish-
Germans’/people of Muslim faith to the sociocultural backward and poorly-integrated. 
Furthermore, the association of people of Muslim faith to the fanatic, intolerant and non-
democratic (Foroutan 2013, 6) has induced a strong difference in treatment and 
discrimination regarding naturalization processes as part of the management of unease. 
The logic of securitization of routine centers on naturalization applicants of Muslim faith 
or with a Muslim background. As a consequence of heavy criticism both within and 
outside of Germany, the federal test was introduced and administered to all naturalization 
candidates and less intrusive in character (Orgad 2010, 68). Consequently, naturalization 
candidates from Turkey or naturalized former Turkish citizens create more ‘unease’ than 
the majority of naturalization candidates from the Russian Federation/naturalized former 
Russian citizens do, as Russia is a predominantly Christian nation.   
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In addition, language requirements function as mechanisms of the cultural defense 
policies and are therefore part of the practices of the management of unease. Language 
tests were first mentioned in the 1999 Law on Citizenship, before there were no formal 
language requirements. However, as the Law did not specify the language requirements 
it was within the discretion of the federal states to introduce language tests. Consequently, 
diverse language testing existed across the German states, “ranging from oral interviews 
to written exams” (Goodman 2010, 14; c.f. Goodman 2012, 664–665). Since the reform 
of 2004, language testing has been harmonized. Naturalization candidates have to prove 
language proficiency at level B1 of the Common European Reference Framework for 
Languages by providing a language certificate (testing listening, writing, reading and 
speaking skills) or a German (high school) diploma instead (Green 2010, 177). The 2007 
reform introduced the possibility to naturalize already after six instead of eight years of 
residence, should the applicant be able to prove high levels of integration, inter alia in 
form of language proficiency at level B2 (Green 2010, 177; Hailbronner and Farahat 
2015, 11–12). While a relaxation of naturalization laws for those with a high proficiency 
in German has taken place as they might already naturalize after six years of residing in 
Germany, access of citizenship for people with limited language capabilities has been 
restricted and consequently terminated. This illustrates that good language skills are 
perceived as crucial for becoming part of the ‘German in-group’ and have been reflected 
more and more in the naturalization regime and a feeling of ‘unease’ towards insufficient 
language capabilities.  
Loyalty oaths are a further mechanism of cultural defense policies that can be 
implemented as part of the management of unease. In Germany, loyalty oaths were 
introduced in the 1999 Law on Citizenship requiring “a declaration of loyalty to the free 
and democratic constitutional order” (Hailbronner and Farahat 2015, 16). In 2007, “the 
revised law supplemented the (now amended) written statement of loyalty with an oral 
declaration to be made at the time of the presentation of the naturalization certificate” 
(Green 2010, 177). The two remaining mechanisms, attachment requirements and 
integration contracts, are not part of the German naturalization regime. Nevertheless, the 
expansion of the mechanisms of citizenship tests, language requirements and loyalty 
oaths illustrate that a cultural turn has taken place concerning the naturalization process 
63 
 
in Germany. This is further underlined by further amendments of the German Law on 
Citizenship. Since the reform of 2004, all applicants for naturalization are security 
checked by the Federal Security Service (Green 2010, 177). The barriers for 
naturalization regarding the maximum of criminal charges were also tightened and the 
necessity of proving sufficient funds for existence were expanded to include all adult 
applicants. Prior to this, applicants younger than 23 years did not have to prove sufficient 
means for existence (BMJ 2018, 3; Green 2010, 177; Hailbronner and Farahat 2015, 12). 
Furthermore in 2015 an obligation to report the possession of multiple nationalities was 
introduced in Germany (Thränhardt 2017, 23–24). This clearly illustrates that while a 
relaxation of naturalization laws has taken place as the required time of legal residence 
was reduced from fifteen to eight years, cultural integration requirements and the 
application of criminal law in naturalization control have gained in prominence. This 
illustrates that the feeling of unease with cultural diversity has grown. This fear of foreign 
infiltration (Überfremdung) of the cultural ingroup has led to the implementation of 
cultural integration requirements – the management of unease – of the naturalization 
regime within Germany.  
Finally, dual citizenship can be understood as management of unease – or as reflecting 
management of unease. Regarding dual citizenship with naturalization, some concessions 
have been made since 1999. This shows that a liberalizing trend has taken place 
concerning the practice of restricting dual citizenship with naturalization for all. Practices 
aimed at the management of unease have been relaxed for citizens of countries that are 
perceived as culturally close to Germany, such as for EU citizens, Swiss citizens or for 
Australian and Canadian citizens dual citizenship is either accepted as legally binding or 
prevails in the majority of naturalizations. The 1999 Law on Citizenship correlated with 
the renunciation of the 1963 Convention on Dual Nationality that severely limited the 
toleration of dual nationality. Since the reform of 2007, dual citizenship has been accepted 
as a rule for all EU and Swiss citizens. Before dual citizenship had been accepted for EU 
nationals under the condition of reciprocity in the citizen’s country of origin (Hailbronner 
and Farahat 2015, 7–12). Furthermore, the German Ministry of the Interior has published 
recommendations for countries whose nationals should be naturalized with dual 
nationality, i.e. because their countries of origin do not denaturalize their citizens. In 
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2007, this list included eight countries and has since then been expanded to include 25 
countries in 201521. This liberalizing trend regarding the acceptance of dual citizenship 
has also been reflected in the numbers of naturalizations with dual nationality in general, 
while in 2005 47.2 percent of recently naturalized Germans were allowed to keep their 
former citizenship, in 2017 it was 61.4 percent (c.f. figure 3; 66). For naturalization 
candidates of non-EU countries, naturalization with dual nationality is according to the 
law (with certain exceptions) not possible. However, in administrative practice 
naturalizations with dual citizenship differ largely across former nationality. In 2017, 88.6 
percent of recently naturalized Germans from the United States of America (USA), 88.3 
percent of recently naturalized Germans from Canada, 92.4 percent of recently 
naturalized Germans from Australia and 90.0 percent of recently naturalized Germans 
from New Zealand, were allowed to retain their former citizenship. For recently 
naturalized Germans from Albania (8.3 percent), Macedonia (7.8 percent), Montenegro 
(11.1 percent), Serbia (41.5 percent), and Turkey (17.2 percent) the percentage of people 
allowed to keep their former citizenship was much lower (Destatis 2018a). This illustrates 
that the liberalizing changes regarding naturalizations with dual citizenship have taken 
place only for certain nationalities. The management of unease regarding naturalizations 
with dual citizenship for EU citizens, Swiss citizens, and citizens from the USA, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand has been replaced by a practice of ‘ease’ by (largely) 
accepting dual citizenship for those groups. The management of unease, however, 
prevails towards other nationalities, such as naturalization applicants/recently naturalized 
Germans from Albania, Macedonia and Turkey.  
Having looked at the difference in discursive representation across the cases of ‘Turkish-
Germans’ and ‘Russian-Germans’, I now turn to practices of naturalization investigating 
how these difference in representation is reflected in these practices – which can be 
understood as management of unease. Looking at the praxis of awarding dual citizenship 
                                                          
21 The 25 countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Cuba, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Eritrea, Honduras, Iran, Lebanon, the Maldives, Mexico, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia and Uruguay. However, in some cases the 
recommendations target specific groups only, i.e. many Latin American countries prohibit denaturalization 
of nationals only if they were born in the respective country (BMI 2015, 32–33; Thränhardt 2017, 24).   
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as part of the naturalization process across the cases of recently naturalized former 
Turkish and Russian citizens (c.f. figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67), it becomes evident that the 
percentage of naturalization with dual citizenship has permanently been lower for 
recently naturalized former Turkish citizens than for recently naturalized former Russian 
citizens. This reflects the difference in representation of the two groups, whereas one 
creates much more ‘unease’ than the other. The difference is particularly salient in the 
years of 2005 – 2007 (c.f. figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67), where the share of naturalized 
Russian-German citizens even exceeds the percentage of total naturalizations with dual 
nationality. While the percentage of naturalized Russian-German citizens remains 
significantly higher until the year of 2013, starting from 2014 the share decreases so that 
in 2016 and 2017 the share of naturalizations with dual citizenship is almost equal for 
recently naturalized Turkish-Germans (16.4 percent in 2016, 17.0 percent in 2017) and 
Russian-Germans (18.0 percent in 2016, 17.4 percent in 2017). Figure 3 illustrates that 
the share of acceptance of dual nationality is generally higher for women (c.f. figure 3, 
66; c.f. Thränhardt 2017, 15). However, this does not hold true for naturalized Russian-
German and Turkish-German citizens. The lower share of naturalized female Turkish-
German citizens might be connected to the above-mentioned headscarf debate (c.f. 
chapter 4.1.4) that constructs Muslim women as subordinate to men and as objects of 
Muslim fundamentalism, patriarchalism and paternalism.  This is reflected by a survey 
conducted by a research group, led by Dr. Naika Foroutan, that shows that 38 percent of 
the German citizenry believe that whoever wears a headscarf cannot be German. 
Moreover, Muslim women wearing a headscarf and people with a Muslim migrant 
background in general are perceived as counter categories to the German self-perception 
among large parts of the population (Foroutan et al. 2014, 6–7). Regarding the lower share 
of naturalized female Russian-German citizens the discursive analysis of the 
representation of Russian-Germans in German discourse does not indicate reasons for the 
difference in treatment. Also, looking at the educational attainments of Spätaussiedler 
and immigrants from the former Soviet Union (including Russia), female immigrants 
were even better educated than male immigrants to Germany (Worbs et al. 2013, 46). 
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 Share of 
naturalized 
Germans retaining 
dual citizenship (in 
percent) 
Share of 
naturalized 
Turkish-
German 
citizens among 
naturalized 
(former) 
Turkish 
citizens (in 
percent) 
Share of 
naturalized 
Russian-
German 
citizens among 
naturalized 
(former) 
Russian 
citizens (in 
percent) 
Share of  
Spätaussiedler 
(late resettlers) 
*** among 
naturalized 
(former) Russian 
citizens 
year Ø   Ø   Ø   Ø   
2005 47.2** 47.8 46.5 15.3 16.0 14.3 57.1 65.3 51.3 - - - 
2006 51.0 52.0 50.1 15.9 16.5 15.1 59.3 65.4 54.7 - - - 
2007 52.4 52.3 52.5 17.1 17.3 16.7 62.3 70.1 56.8 - - - 
2008 52.9 53.0 52.7 18.2 18.3 18.2 39.6 49.3 33.4 - - - 
2009 53.7 53.8 53.6 22.0 22.5 21.5 27.3 32.9 23.9 - - - 
2010 53.1 52.9 53.3 27.7 27.8 27.6 32.8 41.2 27.4 39.1 42.0 37.1 
2011 50.4 50.2 50.6 26.3 26.5 26.0 31.9 38.3 27.7 30.3 34.2 27.6 
2012 50.0 48.7 51.4 22.6 22.4 23.0 30.4 35.7 27.0 25.6 27.6 24.1 
2013 49.7 47.5 51.7 17.5 17.4 17.6 32.3 37.5 28.6 22.1 23.7 21.0 
2014 53.6 52.1 55.1 17.1 17,6 16.4 24.3 30.0 20.6 27.5 28.5 26.7 
2015 54.2 53.0 55.2 17.5 18,0 17.0 22.3 28.2 18.8 42.3 45.8 39.7 
2016 57.8 57.3 58.1 16.4 17.1 15.8 18.0 22.0 15.7 47.3 51.9 44.1 
2017 61.4 60.9 61.9 17.0 17.1 17.0 17.4 15.4 20.9 49.7 54.7 46.4 
Figure 3. Dual citizenship with naturalization in Germany 2005 – 2017  
*Ø=average; =male; =female 
**All values are given in percentage.  
***Percentage of Spätaussiedler (late resettlers) of all naturalized (former) Russian citizens; numbers of Spätaussiedler among 
naturalized former Russian citizens have been indicated since the year of 2010 only 
**** Grey shaded areas indicate a higher share of acceptance of dual nationality for women 
Source: Destatis (2006-2017a, 2017b, 2018a) 
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Figure 4. Dual citizenship with naturalization in Germany 2005 – 2017  
Source: Destatis (2006-2017a, 2017b, 2018a) 
 
Regarding the case of naturalized Russian-German citizens it can hardly be said in what 
way the share of naturalizations with dual citizenship is influenced by the immigration of 
the Spätaussiedler as numbers are not provided by the Federal Statistical Office. 
According to Worbs et al. (2013, 41–42) the share of dual Russian-German citizens 
among the group of (Spät)-Aussiedler who immigrated from the Russian Federation to 
Germany lies at 26.3 percent. This is due to the fact that in accordance with paragraph 
seven of the Law on Citizenship (Spät-)Aussiedler are naturalized without necessarily 
having to renounce their former citizenship (BMJ 2018, 2; Worbs et al. 2013, 42), a 
management of ‘ease’ in naturalization practice towards the (Spät-)Aussiedler. Therefore, 
the high percentage of naturalized Russian-German citizens among former Russian 
citizens might partially relate to the naturalization of Spätaussiedler. However, looking 
at figure 3 shows that the percentage of naturalized Russian-German citizens does not 
correlate to the share of Spätaussiedler among naturalized former Russian citizens as the 
share is sometimes significantly higher (i.e. 2010, 2015, 2016, 2017) and sometimes 
lower (2013, 2013). Also, when comparing the numbers of Spätaussiedler immigrating 
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from the Russian Federation to Germany in the years of 2005 – 2009 to the numbers of 
naturalized former Russian citizens with and without dual citizenship the numbers of 
immigrating Spätaussiedler does not always correspond to the numbers of naturalized 
Russian-German citizens. This means that the observed high share of naturalized Russian-
German citizens is not reducible to the effect of Spätaussiedler (c.f. figure 5 and 6).  
 
 
year 
Total number of 
immigrating 
Spätaussiedler from 
the Russian 
Federation 
Total number of 
naturalizations of 
former Russian 
citizens 
Total numbers of 
naturalized 
Russian-German 
citizens 
2005 21.113 5055 2885 
2006 5189 4679 2773 
2007 3735 4069 2534 
2008 2682 2439 967 
2009 1935 2477 677 
Figure 5. Immigration of Spätaussiedler from Russia and numbers of 
naturalized former Russian citizens/naturalized Russian-German citizens  
Source: Source: Destatis (2006-2017a, 2017b, 2018a); Worbs et al. (2013) 
 
Figure 6. Immigration of Spätaussiedler from Russia and numbers of 
naturalized former Russian citizens/naturalized Russian-German citizens  
Source: Source: Destatis (2006-2017a, 2017b, 2018a); Worbs et al. (2013) 
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This finding of different groups being treated differently echoes the existing literature 
(Thränhardt 2017). The unequal treatment at the federal level is exacerbated even more 
at federal state level. For example, in Bavaria, naturalized Turkish-German citizens 
amounted to 2.8 percent in 2016 and 3.8 percent in 2017. Whereas, naturalized Russian-
German citizens amounted to 51.0 percent in 2016 and 39.0 percent in 2017 (Bayerisches 
Innenministerium 2016, 9; Bayerisches Innenministerium 2017, 10). In Saxony-Anhalt, 
naturalized Turkish-German citizens amounted to 12.5 percent in 2017. Naturalized 
Russian-German citizens totaled up to 37.0 percent (Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen-
Anhalt 2018, 21). In Saxony, naturalized Turkish-German citizens amounted to 7.5 
percent and naturalized Russian-German citizens to 15.1 percent in 2016 (Statistisches 
Landesamt des Freistaates Sachsen 2017).22 Overall, what these statistics of naturalization 
with dual nationality show is that administrative practices regarding naturalizations with 
dual citizenship are shaped by an immense asymmetry in treatment. In some cases, the 
acquisition of dual citizenship with naturalizations is (legally) accepted and part of the 
logic of the naturalization routine in Germany reflecting relative ‘ease’ for those groups. 
In other cases, dual nationality with naturalization is much less a routine procedure and 
treated as much more problematic reflecting the relative ‘unease’ for those groups. 
Naturalized Turkish-German citizens are clearly outside the everyday practices of 
bureaucracies across time. Regarding naturalized Russian-German citizens the picture is 
more nuanced. Over time the administrative practices have tightened up and the share of 
naturalizations with dual citizenship have significantly decreased. However, numbers of 
(Spät)-Aussiedler immigrating from the Russian Federation to Germany, while having 
decreased until the year of 2012, have increased since the year of 2012, albeit at a very 
low level. While in 2012, 1,817 Spätaussiedler arrived in Germany, 6,118 arrived in the 
year of 2015 (BAMF 2017). Also, the share of Spätaussiedler among naturalized former 
Russian citizens has increased significantly since the year of 2014 (compare figure 3, 66). 
A look at the administrative practices in Bavaria, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt shows that 
the share of naturalized Russian-German citizens differs at federal and federal state level.  
                                                          
22 The remaining federal states did not give numbers for naturalizations with dual citizenship at all or only 
broken down by continent (not country). 
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Regarding naturalization laws and naturalizations with dual citizenship in Germany a 
liberalization has taken place as the time of residence necessary for naturalization has 
been halved and dual citizenship has been legally accepted for EU and Swiss nationals. 
However, shortly after the liberalization of naturalization laws, cultural integration 
requirements were introduced and tightened over time. Similarly, while the acquisition of 
dual citizenship was loosened in legal terms and in administrative practice for certain 
nationals, for the naturalization of other nationals with dual citizenship remains virtually 
impossible. An immense difference in treatment and ‘unease’ towards naturalization 
applicants with Muslim faith/of a Muslim migrant background including naturalized 
Turkish-German/naturalized former Turkish citizens has to be ascertained. Concerning 
naturalized Russian-German/naturalized former Russian citizens the picture is more 
nuanced. The share of naturalized Russian-German citizens has severely fallen among the 
group of naturalized former Russian citizens (c.f. figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67). While the 
immigration of (Spät-)Aussiedler has certainly influenced the relative ‘ease’ towards 
naturalization applicants from Russia especially in the years 2005 – 2008 (c.f. figure 3, 
66; figure 4, 67), at a federal state level, the exact impact of the immigration of (Spät-
)Aussiedler cannot be determined as statistics are partially missing and numbers of 
naturalized former Russian citizens, naturalized Russian-German citizens and the 
immigration of (Spät-)Aussiedler do not always correlate (c.f. figure 5, 68; figure 6, 68).
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5. Conclusion 
The analysis illustrates that two discourses, a conservative and a liberal discourse, exist 
in regard to the center right discourse on dual citizenship in Germany. It further shows 
that the debate on (dual) citizenship is being conducted amidst two diametrically opposed 
understandings of integration. The conservative discourse understands social integration 
as essential for legal integration meaning that the acquisition of (dual) citizenship might 
only follow successful social integration. The liberal discourse, in contrast, considers 
legal integration to be the key to social integration. According to this understanding, legal 
integration forms the ultimate starting point for social integration. The conservative 
discourse seeks to securitize the discourse on (dual) citizenship by presenting the German 
identity (referent object) as being in danger of degradation. This degradation of the 
German identity is intertwined with the non-integration or failed integration of foreigners 
that pose a risk to German society. The foreigner, the Other, in the conservative discourse 
is ‘the Turk’/are ‘the Turkish-Germans’. ‘Russian-Germans’ are of minor to no 
importance in the discursive securitization of (dual) citizenship. The representation of the 
‘Turkish-Germans’ as inferior and as subverting the norms of the self in the form of their 
non-integration feeds into the securitization move of the conservative discourse as a prime 
example for bad/failed integration. The ‘Turkish-Germans’ are turned into the referent 
subject in the conservative discourse’s securitization move that seeks to establish German 
identity as a referent object and thereby, as existentially threatened. Looking at the two-
stage process of securitization that differentiates between the stage of identification 
(rhetorical securitization) and the stage of mobilization (active securitization) (Roe 2008), 
only the stage of rhetorical securitization is met. The CDU-signature campaign mirrors 
the audience’s support for the conservative discourse’s securitization move. However, as 
jus soli-elements were introduced in 2000 and further strengthened in 2014 one cannot 
speak of having reached the second stage – the stage of active securitization – where 
actual emergency measures are being implemented. The liberal discourse does not 
securitize/make a securitizing move concerning the issue of (dual) citizenship. There is 
no account of a threat but rather the setting of an objective that is to modernize the 
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currently valid Law on Citizenship. Having said this, the representation of the CDU’s 
signature campaign constitutes the endeavor of a counter-securitizing move. This 
counter-securitizing move appears to a very limited extent though, as only claim and 
demand of the generic structure of Stritzel and Chang’s operationalization of the linguistic 
and grammatical structure can be filled with content.  
Concerning the management of unease in the naturalization practices in Germany, this 
thesis illustrates that a liberalization of naturalization laws was followed by the 
subsequent implementation of cultural integration requirements in the form of citizenship 
tests, language tests, and loyalty oaths. The adoption of cultural integration requirements 
is emblematic for an ‘unease’ towards the cultural Other. This is further supported by the 
application of criminal law in naturalization control. The ‘unease’ towards the cultural 
Other is particularly strong concerning naturalization applicants of Muslim faith/with a 
Muslim migrant background including naturalized former Turkish/Turkish-German 
citizens. This practice of ‘unease’ reflects the representation of the ‘Turkish-Germans’ as 
‘inferior’ to ‘Germans’. Regarding naturalized former Russian/Russian-German citizens, 
practices of the management of unease are more diverse. In the years of 2005 – 2008 (c.f. 
figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67), this study depicts a relative ‘ease’ towards naturalized former 
Russian/Russian-German citizens in the form of high numbers of naturalization with dual 
citizenship. This number, however, decreases over time until reaching an absolute low in 
the year 2017, where naturalizations with dual citizenship were almost the same across 
the two cases of investigation. When looking at naturalization statistics at a federal state 
level, the picture becomes even more complex. There are three states that provide detailed 
numbers/percentages of naturalization with dual citizenship across countries, the share of 
naturalized Turkish-German citizens has been extremely low (c.f. page 60–61) in all three 
federal states in 2016/2017. Concerning the share of naturalized Russian-Germans this 
thesis discerned a stark difference between the state of Bavaria where naturalization with 
Russian-German citizenship amounted to 51.0 percent in 2016 and 39.0 percent in 2017 
(Bayerisches Innenministerium 2016, 9; Bayerisches Innenministerium 2017, 10) and the 
state of Saxony where naturalizations with Russian-German citizenship amounted to to 
15.1 percent in 2016 (Statistisches Landesamt des Freistaates Sachsen 2017). This clearly 
shows that naturalization routines, relative ‘unease’/’ease’, towards naturalizations with 
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Russian-German citizenship differ on a state and federal state level. On a state level, the 
relative ‘ease’ that prevailed in the years of 2005 – 2008 has slowly been replaced by an 
‘unease’ towards naturalizations with dual Russian-German citizenship that clearly 
manifests itself in the years 2015 – 2017 (c.f. figure 3, 66; figure 4, 67). While this 
‘unease’ is reflected in the naturalization practice of the state of Saxony in 2016, relative 
‘ease’ towards naturalizations with Russian-German citizenship still prevails in Bavaria 
and Saxony-Anhalt in 2016 – 2017. The high share of naturalized Russian-German 
citizens in 2005 – 2008 as well as the decreasing and low share of naturalized Russian-
German citizens in 2009 – 2017 is not reducible to the effect of immigration of 
Spätaussiedler, as the number/share of naturalized Russian-German citizens do not 
always correlate to the number/share of immigrating Spätaussiedler (c.f. 5 and 6) or 
naturalized Spätaussiedler (c.f. 3). The representation of ‘Russian-Germans’ as slightly 
different is reflected in a relative ‘ease’ towards naturalized former Russian 
citizens/Russian-German citizens in the years of 2005 – 2008 and in the practices of the 
federal states of Bavaria and Saxony-Anhalt. However, the changing practices at state 
level – the practice of ‘unease’ that replaces the practice of relative ‘ease’ – does not 
mirror the representation of ‘Russian-German’ as a paradigm of successful integration 
(c.f. figure 2, 58).  
By analyzing the securitization of (dual) citizenship in Germany this thesis contributes to 
closing the research gap that exists in applying the securitization theory (discursive 
securitization and the securitization of routine) to citizenship as such and dual citizenship 
in particular. The combination of the two approaches across the two cases showed that 
analyzing the discursive securitization alongside the securitization of routine enriches the 
analysis of securitization processes. This is particularly true as discursive 
(non)securitization might be mirrored in the securitization of routine as in the case of 
‘Turkish-Germans’ and naturalized former Turkish/Turkish-German citizens but might 
also differ as exemplified in the case of ‘Russian-Germans’ and naturalized former 
Russian/Russian-German citizens. Looking only at discursive securitization or 
securitization of routine alone might, consequently, show a one-sided picture. By solely 
investigating the center-right discourses on (dual) citizenship, this study is clearly limited 
as it depicts securitization processes and representations of ‘Turkish-Germans’ and 
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‘Russian-Germans’ within these very concrete center-right discourses. Consequently, for 
future research, it would be interesting to investigate how the securitization processes 
differ across various discourses of the political spectrum, across regions and across 
tabloid and non-tabloid newspapers and whether the diverse discourses can account for 
changes in the practices towards naturalized ‘Russian-German’ citizens, and for 
differences in treatment across the federal states. 
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